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THE ROLE OF DISSENTS IN THE 
FORMATION OF PRECEDENT 
NINA VARSAVA∗ 
ABSTRACT 
I argue that dissenting opinions play an important role in the 
formation of precedent in the context of plurality decisions. Courts 
typically treat plurality cases as precedential. However, procedures for 
interpreting and following plurality decisions vary considerably across 
courts and judges, producing major inconsistencies in the adjudication 
of cases that are ostensibly governed by the same law. I suggest that, 
when a majority of judges agrees on legal principle, that principle 
should have binding effect, even if the judges in principled agreement 
disagree on result or case outcome. I explain why some courts and most 
commentators have categorically excluded dissents from the holding 
category, and why that move is mistaken. First of all, an analysis of the 
holdings/dicta distinction shows that, in some cases, dissenting views 
belong on the holding side. Second, if we think that principled 
decisionmaking is fundamental to the authority and legitimacy of case 
law, then judicial agreement at the level of rationale or principle merits 
precedential status, even where those who agree on principle disagree 
on how a case should come out. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under stare decisis or the doctrine of precedent, judges are 
supposed to follow previously decided cases, regardless of whether 
they agree with them and even if these past cases were in fact 
incorrectly decided. The legal propositions that a case establishes or 
affirms might be difficult to discern and open to multiple competing 
interpretations; nevertheless, we know at least that we can find these 
propositions in the majority opinion. But what about plurality 
decisions—cases that are decided without the support of a majority 
opinion? Courts generally do treat this kind of decision as 
precedential. However, uniform procedures for interpreting and 
applying plurality decisions as precedent are lacking. Practices vary 
considerably across courts and judges, producing major 
inconsistencies in legal outcomes among cases that are ostensibly 
governed by the same law. 
The United States Supreme Court has touched on the problem of 
the precedential effect of plurality decisions, but has failed to 
articulate any clear or definitive solutions. In December 2017, the 
Court granted certiorari in a case—Hughes v. United States—that 
turned on the interpretation of a plurality precedent.1 Hughes 
concerned the rights of previously convicted defendants who had 
accepted plea bargains: the defendant argued that he should be 
eligible for a sentence reduction given that the Sentencing 
Commission had reduced the recommended sentencing range for his 
crime after he was sentenced. In the precedential case, Freeman v. 
United States, the Court had issued a plurality decision with four 
justices joining the lead opinion, one justice concurring in result only, 
and four joining in a dissent.2 The plurality and concurrence had 
decided in favor of the defendant on different grounds entirely. 
Depending on which opinion or combination of opinions a 
precedent-bound court takes as binding, an individual who took a 
plea bargain in the shadow of a now-obsolete recommended 
sentencing range may or may not be eligible for a sentence reduction. 
The federal circuits were divided on the issue because they disagree 
 
 1.  Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018). Oral argument was held on March 27, 
2018, and the Court issued its decision on June 4, 2018.  
 2.  564 U.S. 522 (2011).  
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about the appropriate method of interpreting plurality decisions as 
precedent. The parties in Hughes devoted considerable portions of 
their briefs to the plurality precedent issue, and multiple amicus briefs 
focused on the topic.3 Oral argument also revolved largely around the 
question of how to follow a plurality decision as a precedent. 
Nevertheless, as with many other cases in the 2017-18 term, the Court 
ultimately dodged the difficult issue. Instead of showing courts how 
Freeman ought to be interpreted, it decided the sentencing question 
on the merits. 
As Justice Kennedy explained, “it [was] unnecessary to consider 
[the plurality precedent issue] despite the extensive briefing and 
careful argument the parties presented to the Court concerning [it].”4 
Had the Court resolved the precedent issue, laws governing a wide 
variety of topics—including affirmative action, free speech, takings, 
and federalism—would have been affected, since the Supreme Court 
has issued plurality decisions on each of these topics. Nevertheless, the 
Court declined the opportunity to clarify or develop the doctrine of 
plurality precedent, and the issue remains a live one. 
Both state and federal judges have proposed and applied different 
methods for following plurality decisions as precedent, and scholars 
and commentators have in turn endorsed, rejected, and elaborated 
various methods. Despite the disagreement regarding how courts 
ought to apply plurality decisions, scholars seem to largely agree on at 
least one point: dissenting opinions do not, and should not, count. I 
call this position the conventional view. I argue that the conventional 
view is mistaken. I propose the dissent-inclusive view as an alternative. 
On the dissent-inclusive view, dissenting opinions can be critical to a 
case’s precedential effect. An approach to following plurality 
decisions that requires the consideration of dissenting opinions fits 
better with well-established doctrine and basic principles than does an 
approach that categorically excludes dissents. I argue that, accordingly, 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Brief of Petitioner at 37–59, Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) 
(No. 17-155); Brief for the United States in Opposition at 8–17, Hughes v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155); Reply Brief of Petitioner at 12–25, Hughes v. United States, 138 S. 
Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155); Brief Amicus Curiae of Chantell and Michael Sackett and Duarte 
Nursery, Inc., in Support of Petitioner at 6–40, Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) 
(No. 17-155); Brief Amicus Curiae for Agric., Bldg., Forestry, Livestock, Mfg., Mining, and 
Petrol. Bus. Interests in Support of Petitioner passim, Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 
(2018) (No. 17-155); Brief of Professor Richard M. Re as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither 
Party passim, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155). 
 4.  Hughes, 138 S. Ct. at 1772. 
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courts sometimes have an obligation to take dissenting material as 
binding. 
The first Part of this Article lays out the problem that plurality 
decisions pose for the purposes of precedent, introduces different 
types of plurality decision, and delineates in detail the dual-majority 
type, which represents an important subset of plurality decisions. The 
second Part takes up the principled and widely accepted distinction 
between holdings or ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. I explain why 
some courts and the majority of commentators have categorically 
excluded dissents from the holding category and why that move is 
mistaken. I then present various possible methods for dealing with 
plurality decisions and discuss their deficiencies. Part III calls on the 
importance of principled decisionmaking in adjudication to further 
defend the claim that judicial agreement at the level of rationale or 
principle merits precedential status, even where those who agree on 
principle disagree on how a case should come out. 
I. THE PLURALITY PROBLEM 
A. Pluralities and Dual Majorities Defined 
On any multi-member court, judges can agree or disagree on not 
only a case’s outcome but also the reasoning behind a case’s outcome. 
A plurality decision results when no single majority of the court 
agrees on both reasoning and outcome. Although outcome is 
generally binary—for example, holding for the plaintiff versus the 
defendant or affirming versus reversing the lower court—many 
alternative rationales might be endorsed to support either possible 
outcome. Accordingly, although disputes almost always generate a 
majority vote on outcome, in many cases no majority agrees on a 
single reasoning-plus-outcome bundle. 
The kind of plurality case that I am most interested in for the 
purposes of this paper is the dual-majority decision. In dual-majority 
cases, some legal test, rationale, justification, grounds, or line of 
reasoning is endorsed by a majority of judges, but that majority is split 
with respect to outcome. For example, one set of judges might reach a 
conclusion in favor of the defendant based on some principle, X. 
Another set of judges endorses the same principle, but believes that it 
better supports an outcome in favor of the plaintiff. Together, those 
judges comprise a majority in support of principle X. 
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Any multi-member court with more than two members can create 
a dual-majority decision, and many permutations of this type of 
decision are possible. Here are some examples (where each number 
stands for one opinion, representing the number of judges voting for 
that opinion, and numbers in brackets represent dissenting opinions): 
a three-member court could issue a 1-1-(1) decision; a seven-member 
court could issue a 2-2-(3) decision, and a nine-member court could 
issue a 4-1-(4) decision. Supposing that the middle opinion endorses 
the same rationale or legal theory as the dissenting opinion, each of 
these scenarios represents a dual-majority decision. Figure 1 
illustrates a simple permutation of a dual-majority decision issued by 
a nine-member court. 
Figure 1. Model Example of a Dual-Majority Decision 
 
 
In reality, cases are often more complicated, since any given 
opinion might contain multiple rationales, legal theories, or lines of 
reasoning, and two opinions might agree as to some rationales but not 
others. In my view, whenever a majority agrees as to some significant 
piece of reasoning, then (assuming the shared reasoning meets other 
conditions that I delineate below) that reasoning has, or should have, 
binding precedential effect. Here, I will focus mainly on the relatively 
straightforward dual-majority scenario where a majority that is split 
on outcome nevertheless largely agrees at the level of rationale—a 
scenario that has occurred many times, even if we look to only U.S. 
Supreme Court cases.5 Moreover, I focus mainly on dual majorities of 
nine-member courts. This is only because most of my examples are 
 
 5.  See infra, note 12 and accompanying material. 
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drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court and most of the literature on 
pluralities revolves around Supreme Court cases. However, I do not 
mean to restrict my argument for the precedential value of dissenting 
opinions to U.S. Supreme Court or even U.S. federal cases; my main 
conclusions extend to U.S. state courts, as well as courts in other 
common law systems, such as the federal and provincial courts of 
Canada. 
B. The Significance of Plurality and Dual-Majority Decisions 
Although plurality decisions amount to a relatively small minority 
of all judicial opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued plurality 
decisions almost every term since the mid-1950s. And plurality 
decisions have become increasingly common over the past century.6 
Between 1955 and 2006 the Court issued 213 pluralities,7 and between 
the 2007 and 2016 terms, it  issued forty-one.8 The federal courts of 
appeal have themselves issued many plurality decisions—these are 
particularly common in en banc scenarios—and those courts need to 
determine not only how to discern the precedential force of Supreme 
Court plurality decisions, but also what to make of their own. State 
supreme courts likewise issue plurality decisions with some regularity, 
and both state and federal courts have to make precedential sense out 
of those as well. 
Moreover, plurality decisions seem to be particularly common in 
cases concerning highly salient and ideologically-charged subject 
 
 6.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Report to the Attorney General: A New Look at Plurality 
Decisions, Office of Legal Policy, Washington, D.C., 1, 1988 (reporting that there were very few 
plurality opinions before 1957); Pamela C. Corley et al., Extreme Dissensus: Explaining Plurality 
Decisions on the United States Supreme Court 31 JUST. SYS. J. 180, 180–81 (2010) (reporting 
forty-five plurality opinions before 1955, with thirty-five of those occurring after 1900, and 
twenty-seven plurality opinions between 1938 and 1955). See also Ryan C. Williams, 
Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 STAN. L. REV. 795, 800 
(2017) (noting that, “[a]lthough Supreme Court plurality decisions were historically rare, they 
have grown more frequent since the mid-century and are now a familiar feature of the Court’s 
decisionmaking”); Linas E. Ledebur, Comment, Plurality Rule: Concurring Opinions and a 
Divided Supreme Court, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 899, 900 (2009) (reporting a significant rise in 
dissenting opinions in the second half of the twentieth century). 
 7.  Corley et al., supra note 6, at 181. 
 8.  To count the Supreme Court plurality decisions for the 2007 to 2016 terms, I first 
collected all plurality decisions as identified by Wikipedia’s Supreme Court term tables (see, 
e.g.,  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_term_opinions_of_the_Supreme_Court_of_the_United 
_States). I then crosschecked this data using Westlaw, and in that process eliminated some of 
the decisions that were initially identified as pluralities. Given this method, my numbers are 
conservative: they more likely underestimate than overestimate the frequency of plurality 
decisions. 
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matter— cases of the type that tend to catch the public’s attention.9 
These cases often implicate or address fundamental values, which is 
perhaps why the Justices are less inclined to compromise in these 
cases than others. Pamela Corley and others have suggested that 
“plurality decisions are important to study because they tend to occur 
in highly salient issue areas such as civil liberties and civil rights.”10 
Judge Christen of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed 
that pluralities often arise “in the most contentious cases where . . . 
the stakes are significant.”11 Although plurality decisions do not 
constitute a large proportion of common law decision-making, they do 
make up an important subset. 
And, although dual-majority cases make up only a subset of 
plurality cases, it is not unusual to find considerable agreement 
between a lead or concurring opinion and a dissenting opinion at the 
level of rationale or principle. The Supreme Court has issued dual-
majority decisions in many important cases across a range of areas, 
including abortion, affirmative action, desegregation, free speech, 
takings, separation of powers, federalism, and environmental 
protection.12 Although some decisions represent obvious cases of dual 
 
 9.  As the Petitioner in Hughes observed, “[s]ome of this Court’s most significant cases—
involving such issues as abortion, gun control, voting rights, affirmative action, capital 
punishment, and the scope of congressional authority under the Commerce Clause—have been 
decided by a plurality decision.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, 19–20, Hughes v. United 
States, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155) (cert. granted Dec 7, 2017) [hereinafter Hughes 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari]. 
 10.  See Corley, Uncertain Precedent: Circuit Court Responses to Supreme Court Plurality 
Opinions, 37 AM. POL. RES. 30, 32 (2009) (demonstrating empirically that plurality decisions are 
more likely in salient, complex, or difficult cases, and in particular in cases concerning civil 
rights or liberties); see also Corley, supra note 6, at 196, 192 (suggesting that pluralities are more 
likely when the case has a high degree of public salience, and demonstrating that cases about 
civil liberties and rights increase the chance of a plurality decision by 47%); James F. Spriggs II 
& David R. Stras, Explaining Plurality Decisions, 99 GEO. L.J. 515, 527 (2008) (observing that 
“plurality decisions tend to occur in difficult and highly salient cases, such as in the areas of civil 
rights and civil liberties—areas in which the law is often unclear and the Justices’ ideological 
proclivities are most relevant”); Williams, supra note 6, at 800 (noting that “plurality decisions 
often occur in cases involving especially difficult and highly salient legal issues on which public 
opinion is sharply divided”); James A. Bloom, Note, Plurality and Precedence: Judicial 
Reasoning, Lower Courts, and the Meaning of United States v. Winstar Corp., 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1373, 1374 (2008) (claiming that “[m]any plurality decisions address fundamental—or 
even politically charged—legal issues”); Ledebur, supra note 6, at 900–01 (“Cases that include 
multiple concurrences and dissents are common, especially in high profile cases.”).  
 11.  United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2016) (Christen, J., concurring). 
 12.  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) (equal protection and desegregation); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) 
(environmental protection); E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998) (takings); Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (free speech); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 
(1989) (abortion); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (affirmative 
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majorities, other decisions are not as clear-cut. In any event, every 
plurality decision represents an opportunity for an interpreter to 
discover principled agreement across the judgment. And judges and 
litigants alike, I argue, should be on the lookout for such agreement. 
C. Clarifying and Illustrating Plurality Decisions 
This subsection is meant to clear up some of the confusion 
surrounding plurality decisions and their precedential effect. When a 
multi-member court decides a case, a majority of judges might agree 
as to rationale or principle, while disagreeing as to outcome: in that 
event, we would have a dual-majority decision. In the most 
straightforward dual-majority case, one majority of judges agrees on 
outcome or result, but disagrees on the appropriate grounds or 
rationale for that result; a different majority agrees on grounds or 
rationale, but disagrees on result. 
Many commentators overlook the significance or even the 
possibility of this eventuality. For example, James Spriggs II and 
David Stras assert that, “[p]lurality opinions [in the context of the U.S. 
Supreme Court] result when five or more justices agree on the result . 
. . but no single rationale or opinion garners five votes.”13 Spriggs and 
Stras conflate rationale with opinion, failing to recognize that judges 
can agree on rationale without agreeing on any single opinion as a 
whole: judges can and sometimes do agree on the grounds that a 
decision should be based on, but disagree as to the result that those 
grounds generate or support.14 Ryan Williams likewise writes that, 
“plurality decisions involve agreement on outcomes alone.”15 And 
Corley has made the same claim: “[i]n fact, cases with plurality 
opinions have at least three opinions, each relying on different legal 
theories.”16 Although plurality decisions do have at least three 
 
action); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) (federalism and jurisdiction); Nat’l 
Mut. Ins. Co. of D.C. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (separation of powers). 
 13.  Spriggs II & Stras, supra note 10, at 519. 
 14.  Ledebur, supra note 6, at 905 says similarly that “no view [in a plurality case] has a 
majority of the Court endorsing it.” Based on that claim, he reasons that none of the opinions 
issued in a plurality case are “automatically-binding” as precedent. Ledebur conflates view and 
opinion, neglecting to recognize that judges might endorse the same view in some important 
respects—for example, they might agree on a governing theory for a case, which might comprise 
several legal principles—without reaching agreement on opinion, since an opinion generally 
contains a result in addition to reasoning. 
 15.  Williams, supra note 6, at 828. 
 16.  Corley, supra note 6, at 180; see also JOCYE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION WRITING 
HANDBOOK 323 (5th ed., 2007) (asserting that, if no opinion secures majority support, then the 
decision has no precedential value because in that event no majority agreed on the reasoning); 
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opinions, each opinion does not necessarily rely on a different legal 
theory. In many plurality cases, two or more opinions rely on the same 
legal theory entirely or to a substantial extent. 
The U.S. Courts government website reveals another type of 
confusion: it instructs readers that the plurality or lead opinion of a 
fractured decision “is the opinion that received the greatest number 
of votes of any of the opinions filed.”17 But that is not right. The lead 
opinion is the opinion that received the most votes of the set of 
opinions that arrived at the conclusion with which a majority of the 
court agreed.18 It is possible, and not uncommon in the plurality 
context, for a dissenting opinion to receive the most support of all 
opinions.19 For example, we could adjust the scenario in Figure 1 
above such that the lead opinion received three votes, the concurring 
opinion received two, and the dissent four. However, by definition, an 
opinion that disagrees with the final judgment of the court is not a 
lead opinion, even if it receives more votes than any other opinion. 
D. A Non-Legal Example of a Dual-Majority Decision 
Here is a non-legal example to help illustrate the dual-majority 
scenario. Imagine a woman, Tamar, with an eight-year-old daughter, 
Shayna, who wants to train to be a competitive gymnast. Tamar is 
inclined to support her daughter’s endeavor because she believes that 
as a parent she should make every effort to support her children’s 
physical well-being. Let’s say Tamar has a sister, Alanna, who agrees 
that Tamar should grant her daughter permission to participate in 
competitive gymnastics, but Alanna’s reason is that parents should 
 
W. Jesse Weins, Note, A Problematic Plurality Precedent: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave 
Marks over Van Orden v. Perry, 85 NEB. L. REV. 830, 831 (“[T]he reasoning behind [plurality] 
decisions’ holdings by definition did not receive majority support.”). 
 17.  Glossary – U.S. v. Alvarez, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
educational-resources/educational-activities/glossary-us-v-alvarez. 
 18.  The terminology is confusing, since plurality decision refers to the whole decision, 
including all the opinions, whereas plurality opinion refers to one of the opinions that comprise 
the plurality decision. Generally, a single plurality or lead opinion is identifiable, although in 
theory there could be more than one, a possibility that commentators tend to overlook. For 
example, a nine-member court could issue four opinions (A-D), where A-C support one 
judgment (say, affirm the lower court) and D supports the opposite judgment (reverse the lower 
court). If two judges vote for Opinion A, two for B, one for C, and four for D, then we would 
have a tie between A and B for most votes of the opinions that support the majority judgment, 
and determining a single lead opinion would require a further decision rule. 
 19.  See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015) (where a dissenting opinion received four 
votes, more than any other opinion); Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014) 
(same). 
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make every effort to ensure that their daughters are popular at school. 
Let’s give Tamar another sister, Marina, who thinks that Tamar should 
not allow her daughter to participate in competitive gymnastics 
because (like Tamar) she believes that parents should try to promote 
their children’s physical well-being. Although Tamar and Alanna 
reach the same conclusion or outcome—that Tamar should allow 
Shayna to take up competitive gymnastics—they disagree as to the 
rationale that should govern such a decision. Tamar and Marina, on 
the other hand, agree at the level of rationale—they both believe that 
parents should make every effort to promote the physical well-being 
of their children—even though they disagree on outcome. 
If the gymnastics decision were a legal dispute decided by a three-
member court of Tamar and her two sisters, the result would be a 
dual-majority decision, with one majority of decisionmakers agreeing 
on the judgment and a different majority agreeing on the appropriate 
grounds for the judgment. 
If Tamar and Marina actually agree at the level of principle and 
apply the same principles to the same set of facts, how could they 
reach different conclusions? Well, it would seem that Tamar and 
Marina likely disagree on some facts, and that this disagreement is 
responsible for their opposing conclusions. Whereas Tamar believes 
that gymnastics would be good for her daughter’s well-being, Marina 
thinks that gymnastics would be detrimental to the girl’s health. 
In the judicial context, we can assume that at the appellate level 
the factual situation is basically settled.20 Nevertheless, sometimes 
judges interpret the facts of a dispute differently or make different 
inferences based on those facts. For example, in Will v. Calvert, a U.S. 
Supreme Court case I discuss in more detail below, a district judge 
(Will) had issued a stay on proceedings in his court because parallel 
proceedings were already underway in state court.21 The question for 
the Court was whether Will had an obligation to hear the case. Some 
of the justices believed that Will’s stay order was effectively a 
dismissal of the case and based their reasoning on that interpretation 
of the facts. However, other justices viewed the stay order in its 
technical sense, as a suspension that could and might be set aside. In 
 
 20.  At the stage of appellate review, findings of fact must be blatantly incorrect in order 
for courts to question them. Even if appellate judges have differing beliefs about the accuracy of 
the facts on the record, then, those beliefs should typically be suppressed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 
52(a) (factual findings “must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous”). 
 21.  437 U.S. 655 (1978). 
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this case, the factions that disagreed on the facts disagreed at the level 
of principle as well. Even if these factions had agreed on principle, 
however, they might have arrived at different results given their 
disagreement regarding the facts. 
E. Other Explanations for Dual-Majority Decisions 
In this section I describe other scenarios that might lead to dual-
majority decisions. The survey is meant to illuminate some of the 
more likely paths to dual majorities and is not exhaustive of all 
possibilities. One might think that dual-majority decisions are illusions 
that occur when groups of judges appear to agree at the level of legal 
rationale, principle, or theory, when in fact there is some hidden 
disagreement at this level that causes them to reach different results.22 
This sort of disagreement might indeed explain some decisions that 
look like dual majorities, but I do not think it accounts for all or even 
most of them. 
Moreover, such hidden disagreement might be slight, which would 
explain why it is not evident. For example, consider the model dual-
majority decision represented by Figure 1 above. Even if there is 
some disagreement between the concurrence and dissent with respect 
to rationale (perhaps, for example, they endorse different versions of 
principle D), supposing that this disagreement is relatively minor, my 
main conclusions about the precedential value of dual majorities 
would be unaffected. 
Plurality decisions are often the result of hard and contentious 
cases, cases where a small difference in principle could tip the scales 
to the opposing side on result. Let’s say that rationales D, E, and F in 
Figure 1 represent a balancing test. The concurring and dissenting 
opinions agree on the factors that ought to be balanced; however, the 
factions might attribute slightly different weighting schemes to the 
factors (for example, 20/20/60 versus 20/30/50). Since the case is a 
close one, that difference could lead the factions to reach different 
results. This disagreement between the concurring and dissenting 
judges could be described as a difference in principle. Nevertheless, 
 
 22.  Inversely, different groups of judges that come to the same conclusion in a case might 
appear to disagree on the proper legal theory to govern the dispute, when they actually agree on 
theory. I take it that this scenario represents what some commentators have referred to as a 
“false plurality” decision. See, e.g., Michael L. Eber, Comment, When the Dissent Creates the 
Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the Prediction Model of Precedent, EMORY L.J. 207, 218 
(2008). 
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we can recognize the substantial agreement on principle between the 
concurrence and dissent in such a case even if their principle schemes 
differ slightly and even if, as a result of that difference, the groups 
reached different conclusions. 
A dual-majority decision can also arise when judges have differing 
views on some matter—for example, a procedural technicality—that is 
beside the point of the central legal dispute. In that event, two groups 
of judges might fully agree on both the appropriate governing 
principles for the dispute and the material facts, and make no errors 
of reasoning, but still reach different outcomes. This is what happened 
in the dual-majority case of Will v. Calvert.23 The question in Will was 
whether and under what conditions a federal judge could decline to 
hear a case that falls within the court’s jurisdiction. Judge Will (of the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois) had 
stayed proceedings of a case in his court on the ground that the 
Illinois state court system was already handling the dispute. The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed Judge Will’s stay and the 
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, remanding the case 
back to the District Court. 
One faction of Supreme Court justices (the plurality) endorsed 
and applied one set of principles (call this set A), and concluded on 
the basis of A that the district judge’s stay order was permissible; 
accordingly, the plurality voted to reverse the lower court’s decision 
against the district judge. Another faction (the concurrence) endorsed 
a different set of principles (call this set B), but did not apply B, and 
accordingly reached no definitive conclusion concerning the district 
judge’s stay order; the concurrence voted to reverse the lower court’s 
decision and remand the case to the district court so that the judge 
could reconsider his stay order in light of B. A third faction (the 
dissent), both endorsed and applied B, concluded that Judge Will’s 
stay was improper, and affirmed the Court of Appeals accordingly. 
The concurrence and dissent agreed on the principles that should 
ultimately govern the case (and most likely on how the case should 
ultimately come out), but disagreed on whether the district court 
judge should have the chance to apply those principles himself. 
Finally, mistakes in reasoning, even aside from factual errors, can 
lead to a dual-majority decision. Even if two groups of 
decisionmakers agree on all relevant principles and facts, one might 
 
 23.  437 U.S. 655 (1978). 
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commit an error in the application of principle to fact. For example, 
imagine that my friend and I are making plans to go to another 
friend’s wedding, which is a few towns away, and we are taking the 
train. We agree on the start time of the wedding, the train speed, and 
the distance. We need to decide which of two afternoon trains to get, 
the one o’clock train or the two o’clock train. We reason according to 
the same principles: we both think it would be disrespectful to arrive 
late and we do not want to be disrespectful; we also think that it 
would be boring to arrive early and we do not want to be bored. But if 
one of us makes a computational error, we might nevertheless come 
to different conclusions regarding which train we ought to take. 
F. The Conventional View of Plurality Decisions and Precedent 
1. Excluding Dissents 
Despite considerable scholarly disagreement about the proper 
precedential effect of plurality decisions, most commentators share 
the belief that material from dissenting opinions cannot be binding on 
subsequent courts. Jonathan Adler, for example, writes that a 
dissenting opinion, “like dicta from a majority opinion[,] does not—
indeed cannot—form part of the holding of the Court.”24 In their 
recent treatise on the law of precedent, Bryan Garner and eleven U.S. 
judges acknowledge the substantial “uncertainty surrounding dual 
majorities’ precedential weight.”25 According to Garner and his 
 
 24.  Jonathan H. Adler, Once More, with Feeling: Reaffirming the Limits of Clean Water 
Act Jurisdiction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT: FIVE ESSAYS 81, 94 
(L. Kinvin Wroth ed., 2007); see also Adam S. Hochschild, Note, The Modern Problem of 
Supreme Court Plurality Decision: Interpretation in Historical Perspective, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 261, 279 (excluding the possibility that any part of a dissenting opinion could bind 
subsequent courts); A.M. Honoré, Note, Ratio Decidendi: Judge and Court, 71 L.Q. REV. 196, 
198 (1955) (claiming that “[dissenting] opinions . . .  cannot form part of the ratio decidendi of a 
case [because] they are not reasons for the order made by the court”); Ken Kimura, Note, A 
Legitimacy Model for the Interpretation of Plurality Decisions, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1593, 1599–
1603, 1615 (1992) (arguing that majority rationales of dual-majority decisions “should have 
limited precedential value”). Michael Eber’s Comment on the topic goes the furthest of any 
work I have been able to find in endorsing the precedential value of dissents in dual-majority 
decisions. He argues that courts should treat dissenting opinions in dual-majority cases as highly 
persuasive because those opinions help to predict how future cases will be decided. See supra 
note 22, at 212, 231–39. (Confusingly, Eber calls dual majorities “cross-cutting majorities,” and 
seemingly reserves the term “dual majority” for a very narrow class of cross-cutting majorities, 
the parameters of which are unclear from the comment.) For judicial statements against 
including dissents in the precedent calculus, see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1029 
(9th Cir. 2016) (Christen, J., concurring) (asserting that “[dissents] do not inform our analysis of 
what binding rule, if any, emerges from a fractured decision”).  
 25.  See GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT, 210, 207 (St. Paul, M.N.: 
VARSAVA_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2019  7:32 PM 
2019] THE ROLE OF DISSENTS IN THE FORMATION OF PRECEDENT 299 
coauthors, “dual-majority alignments” are “not technically binding.”26  
Nevertheless, they suggest that such alignments “should be given 
significant persuasive authority—particularly where decisions are so 
fragmented as to render the Marks framework inapplicable.”27 
2. Narrowest Grounds 
In Marks v. United States, the Supreme Court articulated a method 
for following pluralities, at least of a specific type, but did not provide 
much detail, explanation, or justification for that method. In the 
Court’s words, “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no 
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.’”28 Most of the scholarship on plurality decisions focuses on 
the Marks rule.29 
 a. The Precedential Value of Freeman 
The controversy in Hughes v. United States revolved around the 
correct interpretation of Marks. In Freeman v. United States (which 
had very similar facts to Hughes) the Court divided over the rights of 
defendants who took “(C) agreements”—plea bargains that include 
sentences as specified by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
11(c)(1)(C).30 The Sentencing Reform Act of 198431 enables a 
defendant who was sentenced based on a range specified in the 
Sentencing Commission’s Guidelines to request a sentence reduction 
 
Thomson Reuters, 2016). 
 26.  Id., at 212–13. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977). 
 29.  See, e.g., RANDY KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 142 
(Cambridge University Press 2017) (stating that “the Marks principle . . . governs the binding 
effect of fractured Supreme Court decisions”); Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including 
Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321 (2000); 
Williams, supra note 6 (suggesting that Marks determines the precedential effect of plurality 
decisions); Weins, supra note 16, at 832 (claiming that, “[a]fter the Supreme Court hands down 
a plurality decision, lower courts must discern its precedential value according to the Marks 
doctrine”). 
 30.  Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522 (2011). Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure lays out the procedure for pleas. Rule 11(c)(1)(C) provides that the parties 
may reach a plea agreement, which may specify “that a specific sentence or sentencing range is 
the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply (such a 
recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement).” 
 31.  Codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  
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if the Commission subsequently lowers the recommended range; in 
other words, reduced sentencing ranges can be applied retroactively.32 
The question in Freeman and Hughes was whether the sentence of a 
defendant who took a (C) agreement is “based on” the Commission’s 
Guidelines so that the defendant would be eligible for a sentence 
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).33 
In Freeman, the defendant was convicted of a drug crime and 
accepted a plea agreement that expressly referenced the sentencing 
ranges for that crime as provided in the Commission’s Guidelines. The 
Commission subsequently lowered these ranges, and the defendant 
moved for a reduced sentence.34 A plurality of four (Justices Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan) argued that (1) judges are in charge of 
imposing sentences, not the parties, and (2) judges are required to 
consult the Sentencing Commission Guidelines when sentencing a 
convicted defendant.35 A defendant’s sentence, then, will typically be 
based on the Guidelines; accordingly, whether or not a defendant 
accepts a plea bargain, he will be eligible for a reduced sentence in the 
event that Sentencing Guideline ranges are lowered.36 
The dissenting justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) agreed 
with the plurality that judges are the ones to impose sentences.37 
However, for the dissent, when a judge accepts a plea bargain, the 
judge necessarily bases the defendant’s sentence on the agreement 
itself, and not on the Guidelines.38 The dissent concluded that 
 
 32.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (“The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it 
has been imposed except that . . . in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 USC 994(o) . . . the court may reduce the term of 
imprisonment.”). 
 33.  Freeman, 564 U.S. at 525; Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). 
 34.  Freeman, 564 U.S. at 528. 
 35.  Id. at 525–26, 529 (plurality opinion). The requirement that judges consider the 
Guidelines in the process of sentencing can be found in 18 USC § 3553(a)(4) (“Factors to be 
Considered in Imposing a Sentence”). Note, however, that in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220, 245 (2005), the Court declared that § 3553(a) is unconstitutional to the extent that it 
requires judges to sentence defendants within the Guideline ranges. Post-Booker, the Guideline 
ranges are advisory: judges are required to consult them, to take them into account, but they are 
not required to adhere to them. The question of whether a judge who considers the Guideline 
ranges in a sentencing decision necessarily “bases” her decision on those ranges is a matter of 
interpretation. 
 36.  Freeman, 564 U.S. at 534. 
 37.  Id. at 547 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).   
 38.  Id. at 544. 
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defendants who accept plea bargains are not eligible for reduced 
sentences under 18 U.S.C. 3582.39 
Justice Sotomayor concurred with the plurality’s result, but 
reached that result by way of a completely different path of 
reasoning.40 Like the dissent, Sotomayor claimed that if a judge 
accepts a plea agreement, the defendant’s sentence is based on the 
agreement.41 However, she acknowledged that the plea agreement 
itself could be based on the Sentencing Guidelines, in which case the 
defendant’s sentence would be based on the Guidelines.42 Since the 
sentence indicated in Freeman’s plea agreement was based explicitly 
on the Guidelines, he was eligible for a reduced sentence.43 
Most of the federal courts of appeal have relied on Marks to 
interpret Freeman and have determined that Sotomayor’s reasoning, 
as the “narrowest grounds” for the judgment, represents the Freeman 
rule.44 In Hughes, the Eleventh Circuit assumed that Marks governs 
the interpretation of Freeman and followed Sotomayor’s opinion, 
determining that Hughes was not eligible to seek a sentence 
reduction.45 Like several other circuits,46 the Eleventh Circuit took a 
result-centric approach to Marks as applied to Freeman, reasoning 
that whenever the concurring faction of Freeman would find in favor 
of the defendant, so would the lead faction, whereas the converse is 
not true.47 It is in this sense that the Eleventh Circuit viewed the 
concurrence as representing the “narrowest grounds” for the Freeman 
decision: “Marks requires us to find a legal standard which, when 
applied, will necessarily produce results with which a majority of the 
 
 39.  Id. at 548–551. 
 40.  See id. at 534 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I agree with the plurality that petitioner 
William Freeman is eligible for sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), but I differ as 
to the reason why.”) and id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The plurality and the opinion 
concurring in the judgment agree on very little except the judgment.”).  
 41.  Id. at 538 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 42.  Id. at 534. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1013 (11th Cir. 2017) (agreeing with “eight 
sister circuits” that, under Marks, Justice Sotomayor’s view constitutes Freeman’s holding). See 
also Hughes Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 18 (asserting that ten circuits 
“have concluded that Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman controls [under 
Marks] because it reflects the narrowest result”). 
 45.  Hughes, 849 F.3d at 1013. 
 46.  See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 682 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Brown, 653 F.3d 337, 340 n.1 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rivera–Martínez, 665 F.3d 344, 348 
(1st Cir. 2011). 
 47.  Hughes, 849 F.3d, at 1012–13. 
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Court from that case would agree.”48 The opinion from the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals included no consideration of the Freeman 
dissent and dismissed in a single conclusory sentence the idea that 
dissents might factor into the interpretation of precedent.49 
However, if Marks is interpreted in what we might call a rationale- 
or principle-centric way, there are no “narrowest grounds” in the 
Freeman opinions. On the principle-centric interpretation, the 
narrowest grounds view would have to represent a principle or set of 
principles that any judge signing onto the “broader” opinion would 
also endorse. As some courts have observed,50 and as the petitioner in 
Hughes insisted, “the four-Justice plurality and Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence shared no common rationale”; consequently, the 
Freeman concurrence does not represent binding precedent under 
Marks.51 According to the D.C. Circuit, the “narrowest opinion must 
represent a common denominator of the Court’s reasoning; it must 
embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who 
support the judgment.”52 Both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have 
determined that none of the Freeman opinions is controlling; they 
have followed the lead opinion on the grounds that it is the most 
compelling one.53 
A case where the concurring opinion in fact represents a logical 
subset of the lead opinion (or vice versa) is not a true plurality 
decision, since a majority of judges agreed on a line of reasoning that 
is sufficient to support the judgment. We do not need Marks to 
understand that when a majority of judges agree on a ground for a 
decision together with a judgment, that agreement constitutes the 
controlling portion of the case. I think this is what some 
commentators have noticed in their criticisms of the logical-subset 
reading of Marks. For example, while he was a D.C. Circuit judge, 
 
 48.  Id. at 1014–15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 49.  Id. at 1012 (“When determining which opinion controls, we do not ‘consider the 
positions of those who dissented.’”). 
 50.  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc); 
United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 350 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 51.  Hughes Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at i, 31–34. 
 52.  Epps, 707 F.3d at 348; see also Davis, 825 F.3d at 1021–22 (“A fractured Supreme 
Court decision should only bind the federal courts of appeal when a majority of the Justices 
agree upon a single underlying rationale and one opinion can reasonably be described as a 
logical subset of the other.”). 
 53.  See Hughes Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 10 (noting that “[t]hese 
two circuits . . . have thus found the Freeman plurality opinion more persuasive and on that basis 
have allowed district court reconsideration of defendants’ sentences.”). 
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now-Justice Kavanaugh endorsed a result-centric view of Marks, 
explaining that “in splintered cases, there are multiple opinions 
precisely because the Justices did not agree on a common 
rationale.’”54 Kavanaugh recognized that Marks would be superfluous 
if it merely required courts to follow what are in effect majority 
opinions. Like many other observers, however, he overlooked the 
possibility that judges could share a common rationale but disagree 
on the outcome. In that event, a logical-subset view of Marks would 
not make the doctrine superfluous.55 
In the materials filed by the parties in Hughes, both sides assumed 
unequivocally that if any case governed the application of Freeman to 
Hughes, it was Marks.56 Although Hughes pointed out problems with 
the Marks doctrine and suggested that the Court might want to 
consider overruling that decision, he did not propose any alternative 
protocol for following plurality decisions; instead, he relied on a false 
dichotomy to suggest that abandoning Marks would mean denying 
any precedential effect to plurality decisions.57 Neither party took 
seriously the possibility of considering dissenting opinions in the 
precedent calculus.58 
 
 54.  United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 613 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring 
in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 55.  Some courts have interpreted Marks to allow for the consideration of dissenting 
opinions. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006). The language of the 
Marks opinion suggests that the Marks Court did not intend for dissents to count. However, that 
Court did not have to address the question of dissents, and so arguably the case left open the 
status of dissenting opinions. 
 56.  See, e.g., Hughes Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that a 
writ of certiorari is appropriate because “[t]he courts of appeals are hopelessly divided 
[regarding] the Marks . . . rule”); Brief for the United States in Opposition, supra note 3, at 10 
(contending that the Eleventh Circuit properly applied Marks in Hughes, 849 F.3d, and that 
“the general rule for ascertaining the holding of a case that lacks a majority opinion [comes 
from Marks]”). 
 57.  See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 3, at 56 (stating that, “the Court may conclude that 
the Marks enterprise has failed, and return to a rule that only an opinion joined by a majority of 
Justices establishes binding precedent”).  
 58.  Perhaps this should not be surprising given the nature of the Court’s division in 
Freeman; the principled agreement between Freeman’s lead opinion and dissent is partial and, 
for the purposes of Hughes, does not definitively favor one party over the other. The plurality 
and the dissent agreed that judges are responsible for imposing sentences; accordingly, and 
contra Sotomayor’s concurrence, whether or not a sentence is “based on” sentencing guidelines 
does not depend on the terms of a plea agreement. Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 547 
(2011) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The plurality argued that, “[b]y allowing modification only 
when the terms of the agreement contemplate it, the [concurrence’s] proposed rule would 
permit the very disparities the Sentencing Reform Act seeks to eliminate. . . . There is no good 
reason to extend the benefit of the Commission’s judgment only to an arbitrary subset of 
defendants whose agreed sentences were accepted in light of a since-rejected Guidelines range 
based on whether their plea agreements refer to the Guidelines.” Id. at 533–34 (plurality 
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 b. Criticisms of Marks 
The Marks doctrine has been subjected to widespread criticism by 
courts and scholars alike. I won’t rehearse all the criticisms here, but 
will touch on the most important ones.59 As I see it, there are roughly 
three ways to interpret Marks. First, there is the logical-subset 
interpretation, which takes “narrowest grounds” to refer to the 
opinion that concurred in the court’s judgment based on a subset of 
the principles or rationales contained in a broader opinion that 
reached the same result. On this interpretation, the narrowest grounds 
opinion is binding because it is implicitly endorsed by a majority of 
judges.60 However, in true plurality decisions, no opinion achieves this 
kind of endorsement; on the logical-subset interpretation, then, the 
Marks rule does no work.61 Second, there is the result-centric 
approach, which interprets “narrowest grounds” to refer to the 
opinion that would generate results that a majority of the court would 
endorse.62 This approach depends on untenable and perverse 
assumptions, which I elaborate below in my discussion of the 
 
opinion). The dissent expressed “agree[ment] with the plurality that the approach of the 
concurrence to determining when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) sentence may be reduced is arbitrary and 
unworkable.” Id. at 544 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). However, the Freeman plurality maintained 
that judges are required to base sentences on the Guidelines, even in the context of plea 
bargains, whereas the dissent believed that when a judge accepts a (C) agreement, the judge 
bases the defendant’s sentence on that agreement and not on the Guidelines. Moreover, the 
plurality believed that it would be unfair to plea bargainers to exclude them from the benefit of 
reduced sentences while allowing other defendants that benefit. The dissent viewed the 
disparity as appropriate, since the two groups of defendants are differently situated: defendants 
consensually forfeit the right to sentence reductions that they would otherwise have under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) when they agree to sentences provided in plea agreements. 
 59.  See generally Richard M. Re, Beyond the Marks Rule (Draft of Sept. 9, 2018), 132 
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3090620&download=yes) (arguing that the Supreme Court should abandon the 
Marks rule); Williams, supra note 6 (developing a novel method for following plurality 
decisions, which is motivated by problems with the Marks approach). See also Weins, supra note 
16, at 832 (describing difficulties with Marks). 
 60.  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“A 
fractured Supreme Court decision should only bind the federal courts of appeal when a majority 
of the Justices agree upon a single underlying rationale and one opinion can reasonably be 
described as a logical subset of the other.”); United States v. Epps, 707 F.3d 337, 348 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (“[T]he narrowest opinion ‘must represent a common denominator of the Court’s 
reasoning; it must embody a position implicitly approved by at least five Justices who support 
the judgment.’”).  
 61.  For further discussion of this point, see the previous subsection (I.F.2.a.). 
 62.  See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 849 F.3d 1008, 1014–15 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 138 
S. Ct. 542 (2017) (“Marks requires us to find a legal standard which, when applied, will 
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that case would agree.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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predictive account of precedent.63 Third, there is the “swing vote” or 
“fifth vote” interpretation, which takes “narrowest grounds” to refer 
to the opinion that could tip either way on result, depending on 
factual details that would not affect the outcome for the other 
opinions. Like the result-centric version of Marks, the swing vote 
approach affords precedential status to outlier rationales and 
principles, which eight of nine justices might unequivocally reject.64 
In practice, the Marks doctrine is a mess.65 The Supreme Court 
itself has criticized and departed from Marks for both theoretical and 
logistical reasons. For example, in Nichols v. United States, the Court 
considered the precedential value of a plurality decision and noted 
that the Marks doctrine has “obviously baffled and divided the lower 
courts that have considered it”; the Court observed further that the 
“[the Marks] test is more easily stated than applied.”66 Although the 
Supreme Court has not explicitly overruled Marks, it has expressed a 
preference for alternative approaches in dicta as well as through its 
own efforts to follow plurality cases.67 
As the petitioner in Hughes pointed out, the Marks doctrine fails 
to supply a sensible solution to the interpretation of Freeman. The 
petitioner was mistaken, however, to think that the only viable 
alternative to Marks is to deny any precedential authority to plurality 
decisions. On my view, the doctrine of precedent requires courts to 
follow decisions even where no majority agreed on a single opinion, 
provided that a majority agreed on principle or rationale. In the next 
Part, I develop an affirmative case for this position. 
 
 63.  See infra, Part II.C.3. The Seventh Circuit has referred to the narrowest grounds as the 
“most case-specific basis” for the court’s judgment: this might represent yet another way to 
interpret Marks. See United States v. Dixon, 687 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 64.  See Re, supra note 51, at 27 (criticizing the “median” approach); Williams, supra note 
6, at 814–17 (elaborating multiple problems with the swing vote or “median justice” approach). I 
don’t like the term “median” for the swing vote decisionmaker, since it implies that the swing-
vote view represents a middle ground or compromise position, which is not necessarily the case. 
 65.  See, e.g., Corley, supra note 10, at 568 (“The interpretive rule for plurality decisions, as 
enunciated in the 1977 case of Marks v. United States, is notoriously difficult to apply and even 
impenetrable at times.”). 
 66.  Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 325, (2003) (quoting Nichols for its criticism of Marks). 
 67.  See infra note 97 and accompanying material; see also Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, 
When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality 
Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 440–41 (1992) (noting that the “Court implicitly rejected the 
Marks doctrine” in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), and 
Butler v. McKeller, 494 U.S. 407 (1990)). 
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II. THE PRECEDENTIAL VALUE OF DISSENTING OPINIONS 
A. The Distinction between Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta 
The resistance to the idea of treating principles or rationales from 
dissenting opinions as binding precedent can be explained, I think in 
large part, by mistaken assumptions that have been extrapolated from 
the distinction between holdings and dicta. Judicial opinions are 
comprised of both ratio decidendi (or holdings) and obiter dicta: by 
definition, holdings represent binding legal norms, whereas dicta 
represent all the other material contained in judicial opinions.68 Dicta 
might provide persuasive guidance for future courts, but they do not 
constitute binding precedent. However, holdings and dicta are not 
typically labeled as such. Separating the two can be a tricky business, 
and legal interpreters often disagree on whether some part of an 
opinion counts as ratio or dicta.69 The difference between holdings 
and dicta has been explained and justified primarily by way of two 
principles, which I call the majoritarian principle and the limited 
authority principle. In this part, I elaborate these principles and argue 
that the dissent-inclusive view of precedent is consistent with them. 
1. The Majoritarian Principle 
The majoritarian principle is straightforward: only a majority of 
the court’s members can speak for the court as a whole, and only the 
court as a whole has the authority to make legal decisions that are 
binding on subsequent adjudication. Williams notes that “the 
commitment to majority decisionmaking is among the most deeply 
rooted features of the [U.S. Supreme] Court’s institutional 
practices.”70 The commitment to the majoritarian principle is standard 
 
 68.  See, e.g., Ralph C. Chandler et al., Obiter Dictum, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK, 
§ 8:82 (“The positions represented by obiter dicta are . . . not binding on later cases. Dicta are 
not considered to be precedent and should be distinguished from the ratio decidendi which 
provides the basis of the court’s ruling.”). 
 69.  See, e.g., Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers 
of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1738 (2013) (noting that “the ground rules for 
discerning the law-generating content and scope of a judicial decision remain remarkably 
murky”). 
 70.  Williams, supra note 6, at 845; see also AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY, 356, 357–61 (2012) 
(observing that, “[f]rom its first day to the present day, the [Supreme] Court has routinely 
followed the majority-rule principle without even appearing to give the matter much thought”); 
Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM. L. 
REV. 756, 764 (1980) (claiming that the views of a minority of Supreme Court justices “should 
not be binding on lower courts”). For judicial pronouncements of the principle, see, e.g., United 
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among multi-member courts broadly.71 As Linas Ledebur explains, 
“this reliance on a majority echoes the tenets of democracy and 
fairness upon which the United States was founded. . . . congressmen 
are elected based on the recipient of the majority of votes, laws are 
passed only when a majority in congress votes on the law, and 
Presidents are elected if they secure a majority of electors.”72 A strong 
and settled majoritarian intuition underlies stare decisis 
jurisprudence.73 
The dissent-inclusive view that I endorse respects the majoritarian 
principle: rationales or legal theories elaborated in a judicial decision 
are precedential if and only if a majority of the court agrees on them. 
2. The Limited Authority Principle 
According to the limited authority principle, the scope of judicial 
authority to pronounce the law is limited and not all material included 
in a judicial opinion has the force of binding law.74 A court is 
empowered to decide a legal issue only if parties in interest raise the 
issue and litigate it.75 Although judges have wide latitude concerning 
the material they include in an opinion, the legal effect of that 
material is limited to arguments and conclusions concerning the 
 
States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 1014, 1036 (9th Cir. 2016) (Bea, J., dissenting) (asserting that, “our 
courts adhere to that most democratic of principles: as to how to decide this case, the majority 
rules”). 
 71.  Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15, 33 n.120 (characterizing “[m]ultimember 
courts [as] majoritarian”). 
 72.  Ledebur, supra note 6, at 902; see also Kimura, supra note 24, at 1597 (suggesting that 
the “numerical [majoritarian] test for precedential legitimacy is justified by the incoherence of 
any approach that does not incorporate a numerical component”). 
 73.  See Joseph M. Cacace, Note, Plurality Decisions in the Supreme Court of the United 
States: A Reexamination of the Marks Doctrine After Rapanos v. United States, 41 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 97 n.250 (2007). For an extended examination of the principle of majoritarianism in the 
context of adjudication, including a discussion of different conceptions of the principle, see 
Kimura, supra note 24, at 1597–98. See also Jeremy Waldron, Five to Four: Why Do Bare 
Majorities Rule on Courts? 123 YALE L.J. 1626 (2013) (asking why majoritarian decisionmaking 
is appropriate in the context of adjudication, and examining possible justifications for the 
practice).  
 74.  See Williams, supra note 6, at 846 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court “has repeatedly 
emphasized the distinction [between ratio and dicta] as a meaningful constraint on its own 
authority to establish binding precedent—for itself and for lower courts”). 
 75.  See Eber, supra note 22, at 229 (“Courts may disfavor even well-considered dicta for a 
structural reason, namely the concern that courts are not authorized to make law in the 
abstract.” (citing Dorf, 2000–01)); see also A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and 
the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in 1 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148, 160–61 
(asserting that courts can issue binding legal norms only insofar as those norms are “relevant to 
the determination of the actual litigation before the court in which they are empowered to sit.”).  
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dispute at hand.76 When judges make claims about hypothetical cases, 
for example, those claims do not constitute binding precedent. As 
others have explained, “[t]his conservative position derives from the 
function of the common law judiciary to resolve only the dispute 
before the court,” 77 a function that itself has multiple bases—
including Article III of the U.S. Constitution.78 Article III’s Case or 
Controversy Clause provides that the judicial power extends to actual 
cases and controversies, suggesting that the judiciary does not have 
the power to decide issues that go beyond the facts of the disputes it is 
asked to resolve.79 The distinction between ratio and dicta (along with 
other doctrines, including standing) fulfills the Constitution’s case or 
controversy requirement and serves the values associated with that 
requirement—including separation of powers.80 
 
 76.  See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(proclaiming that, “[the Court’s] authority begins and ends with the need to adjudge the rights 
of an injured party who stands before us seeking redress.”). 
 77.  Thurmon, supra note 67, at 432; see also Williams, supra note 6, at 846–47 (discussing 
sources of and explanations for restricting the judiciary’s power to the actual issues it is asked to 
resolve). For judicial opinions noting this limitation on judicial authority, see DaimlerChrysler 
Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911); 
People of State of California v. San Pablo & T.R. Co., 149 U.S. 308, 314 (1893). 
 78.  Although Article III does not apply to state judges, state courts generally assume or 
embrace similar limitations on their power to decide legal questions and declare what the law is. 
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2001 n.16 (1994) 
(noting that “parallel state law concerns about accuracy and legitimacy will typically inform the 
holding/dictum distinction in state courts”); Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing 
in State Courts, 8 KY. J. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 349 (2015–2016) (discussing 
the issue in the context of standing). Courts in common law jurisdictions outside the U.S. also 
accept similar restrictions regarding the material in judicial opinions that counts as precedential, 
even though these court are not subject to Article III constraints. See, e.g., Debra Parkes, 
Precedent Unbound—Contemporary Approaches to Precedent in Canada, 32 MAN. L.J. 135, 137 
(2006) (discussing the Canadian context and observing that “[a] significant limitation on the 
vertical convention of precedent is the reality that courts are only bound to follow ‘what was 
actually decided’ in the earlier case”). 
 79.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For discussions of the case and controversy clause in the 
context of the holdings/dicta distinction, see A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case 
and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in 1 OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 148, 161 (A.G. 
Guest ed., 1961) (“Without some criterion of relevance the judicial power of rulemaking seems 
to have no limit, and in a country wedded to the conception of the rule of law there is naturally 
a desire to state with precision where the limit lies.”); Eber, supra note 22, at 229 n.169 
(remarking that, “[t]he central feature that constitutes a ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ is that it results 
in a judgment”). For a judicial opinion discussing the point, see Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–
96 (1968). 
 80.  See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 576 (1992) (explaining that the case or controversy clause preserves the “separate and 
distinct Constitutional role of the Third Branch,” and sets the “business of the courts” apart 
from the business “of the political branches”); N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line 
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Dorf, supra note 78, at 2001 (explaining that the ratio/dicta distinction 
“ensures that federal courts will make law only insofar as they are competent to do so and that 
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Although few would deny that the judicial power is and should be 
subject to constraints, those constraints are not given to precise 
definition. The traditional view is that a rationale from a precedential 
judicial opinion has binding force if and only if the rationale was 
necessary to the disposition of the case; otherwise, the material is 
dicta.81 Courts often suggest, I think carelessly, that the line between 
holdings and dicta can be drawn at necessity.82 According to Black’s 
Law Dictionary, an obiter dictum is “[a] judicial comment made 
during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is 
unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not 
precedential.”83 Likewise, Rupert Cross and J.W. Harris define the 
ratio decidendi of a case as “any rule of law expressly or impliedly 
treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion.”84 
However, the “necessary connection” definition of a ratio is overly 
restrictive; on this definition, barely any material would qualify as 
binding.85 When judges articulate reasons for a decision, they rarely 
 
in making law they do not usurp the proper role of another branch of government”); Judith 
Resnik, Interdependent Federal Judiciaries: Puzzling about Why & How to Value the 
Independence of Which Judges, 137 DAEDALUS 1, 16–19 (2008); Resnik, Constricting Remedies: 
The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223, 308 (2003). The 
ratio/dicta distinction would seem to serve many of the same purposes as the standing doctrine. 
For example, it helps ensure that judges do not declare or create law in the absence of “that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely 
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 
(1962). It also helps “confine[] the Judicial Branch to its proper, limited role in the 
constitutional framework of Government.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). For a list of the purposes of standing and cases on point, 
see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER’S THE 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 117 (7th ed. 2015). 
 81.  See Williams, supra note 6, at 801–03 (noting that “traditional conceptions of 
precedential legitimacy . . . limit precedential effect to statements that are both supported by a 
majority of the Justices and necessary to the judgment in the precedent-setting case”) (emphasis 
added); see also Thurmon, supra note 67, at 432 (describing and adopting the traditional view, 
where the “ratio is comprised of the postulates or conclusions necessary to reach the result in 
that case.”); Eber, supra note 22, at 223 (articulating the traditional view as follows: “each 
statement of law must . . . form a necessary connection with the judgment . . . to constitute a 
ratio decidendi”). 
 82.  For cases citing the necessary connection constraint, see, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 
F.3d 1308, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[T]hat which is not necessary to the decision of a case is 
dicta.”); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 67 (1996) (“When an opinion issues for 
the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result 
by which we are bound.”); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971) (asserting that a previous 
Supreme Court case (Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965)) does not stand as binding 
precedent for a particular proposition found in the case’s opinion, because that proposition was 
not necessary to the case’s outcome). 
 83.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1102 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed. 2004). 
 84.  RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW 72 (4th ed. 1991).  
 85.  See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 
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suggest that these reasons are the only possible reasons that would 
support the decision. Moreover, in many cases judges offer multiple 
possible rationales in support of their decision. In such cases, no single 
rationale is necessary for the conclusion, yet the rationales are 
generally treated as binding.86 
Accordingly, many commentators have proposed some relaxed 
version of the necessary connection criterion, where the ratio of a case 
consists of the reasoning that is connected in some critical, although 
not strictly necessary, way to the conclusion.87 For example, Michael 
Dorf suggests that the ratio of a case should be understood as any 
material that “forms an essential ingredient in the process by which 
the court decides the case, even if, viewed from a post hoc perspective, 
it is not essential to the result.”88 In a majority opinion for the Seventh 
Circuit, former Judge Richard Posner suggested that only “part[s] of 
the decision that resolved the case or controversy” qualify for the 
status of ratio.89 I find Lewis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager’s 
formulation especially helpful: “[c]asual comments clearly not meant 
to be part of the process of deciding the case actually before the 
Court are disregarded as authority, but not formal determinations of 
issues treated by the Court as salient to the outcome.”90 
Despite this relaxation of the necessary-connection condition, 
commentators generally deny any precedential weight (at least 
 
1027–29 (2005) and Dorf, supra note 78, at 2043–5 (explaining that most common law rules 
could not actually be binding on the strict logical necessity view); see also Williams, supra note 
6, at 826. 
 86.  See id., at 827 (noting that, “[a]s a matter of practice, courts routinely treat both prongs 
of an alternative rationale as part of the holding”); Eber, supra note 22, at 223–24 (noting that 
when two rationales independently lead to the conclusion, although neither is strictly necessary, 
both are generally considered binding). For case law on the point, see Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & 
Co., 932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[A]lternative holdings are binding precedent and not 
obiter dictum.”). 
 87.  See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, STATUTORY AND COMMON LAW INTERPRETATION 
185 (2013) (explaining that, “although the standard formulation [for the holding] is in terms of 
‘necessary to the resolution of the case,’ in the United States at least ‘important in’ is 
substantially more accurate”); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND 
MORALITY, 184 (2009) (stating that the ratio is made up of “the reason(s) by which the court 
justifies its decision”). 
 88.  Dorf, supra note 78, at 2044–45; see also Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 85, at 
1027–29, 1065, 1075-76 (defining a case’s ratio as any reasoning on the “decisional path” that led 
to the court’s judgment); Caminker, supra note 71, at 15 (stating that the ratio is that which 
“justifies the disposition”). 
 89.  United States v. Crawley, 837 F.2d 291, 293 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 90.  Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in 
Collegial Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39 n.62 (1993). 
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beyond persuasive status) to reasoning from dissenting opinions.91 The 
consensus in the scholarly literature is that the rationales endorsed by 
the dissenters in a case do not have the proper connection to the 
case’s outcome. This position is in some sense intuitive, since the 
rationales from dissenting opinions did not lead the dissenters to the 
judgment of the court. By definition, dissenting judges reached a 
conclusion that opposes that of the court. Because in the context of 
adjudication the same set of principles might lead to different results 
in the hands of different decisionmakers, however, it is a mistake to 
categorically deny that dissenting rationales might constitute binding 
precedent. 
In the case of dual-majority decisions, a set of principles that leads 
to the judgment of the court for one group (the plurality or 
concurrence), leads to a different result for another group (the 
dissent). Majority support for the result depends on the votes of both 
lead and concurring judges. In reaching their result, however, either 
the lead or concurring judges relied on the same rationales or theory 
as the dissenting judges. 
Let’s say, for example, that the plurality and concurrence agreed 
that the defendant should prevail, but to reach that result the 
concurrence relied on the same theory that the dissent relied on to 
reach its result. If the concurrence had rejected that theory, then the 
case might have come out differently. That theory, then, is integrally 
connected to the actual judgment of the court, even though no 
majority endorsed the theory and judgment together. 
Many scholars have supposed, to the contrary, that in plurality 
decisions the proper “connection between result and rationale is 
lacking.”92 According to A.M. Honoré, “[t]he fundamental reason why 
the opinions of minority [i.e., dissenting] judges cannot form part of 
 
 91.  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 6, at 820 (asserting that, “[t]aking dissenters’ views into 
account . . . conflicts with the longstanding view that only statements in judicial opinions that are 
in some way ‘necessary’ to the judgment in the precedent case are entitled to precedential 
effect. Because dissents, by definition, are not necessary to the judgment in the precedent case, 
they stand in a position similar to dicta and are thus, arguably, not entitled to precedential 
effect.”). 
 92.  See, e.g., Adler, Reckoning with Rapanos: Revisiting Waters of the United States and the 
Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 14 MO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 14 (discussing 
Rapanos as a dual-majority case and asserting that, “[w]hile there is some amount of agreement 
between Justice Kennedy’s concurrence and the dissenting justices, it would be wrong to view 
any part of Justice Stevens’ dissent as a ‘holding’ of the Court. Nothing in the dissent constitutes 
a portion of the judgment of the Court, so nothing in the dissent is part of the actual holding of 
the case”); Williams, supra note 6, at 801. 
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the ratio decidendi of a case is that they are not reasons for the order 
made by the court.”93 Commentators seem to assume that rationales 
from dissenting opinions by necessity do not support the judgment of 
the court. These commentators thus conclude that, in the context of 
plurality decisions, no majority of the court agreed “on a judgment-
supportive rationale.”94 In the case of a dual-majority decision, 
however, rationales from the dissenting opinion are judgment-
supportive: either the plurality or the concurrence relied on the same 
rationales (as the dissent) to reach its conclusion in favor of the 
judgment of the court. And the votes of both the concurrence and the 
plurality were necessary to establish majority support for the 
judgment of the case. 
Moreover, the purposes of restricting judicial power through the 
ratio/dicta distinction—including to ensure that courts only decide 
issues that have been presented to them and vigorously argued by 
parties in interest on both sides—suggests that dissents are fair game 
for the ratio category. If the dissent’s rationale is directly related to 
the dispute the court has been asked to resolve and integral to the 
court’s process of arriving at its judgment (because the plurality or 
concurrence relied on that rationale), then taking the dissent’s 
rationale as binding precedent will promote, rather than undermine, 
the purposes underlying the ratio/dicta distinction. Although I accept 
the basic principles on which the standard rejections of dissents are 
purportedly based, on my analysis those very principles suggest that 
in some cases dissents have a legitimate role to play in the creation of 
precedential authority. 
B. Case-Based Support for the Dissent-Inclusive View 
Various courts have suggested, in line with the scholarly 
consensus, that dissenting opinions cannot contribute to binding 
precedent.95 But the Supreme Court and many other courts, both 
 
 93.  Honoré, supra note 24, at 198; see also CROSS & HARRIS, supra note 84, at 85 
(asserting likewise that “[dissents] inevitably consist of statements which were unnecessary for 
the decision of the precise question before the court”). 
 94.  Williams, supra note 6, at 835. According to Williams, who endorses the conventional 
view regarding the precedential value of dissents, “like dicta, statements in dissenting opinions 
are neither ‘necessary to’ nor even supportive of the judgment in the precedent-setting case.” Id. 
at 852. 
 95.  See, e.g., United States v. Duvall, 740 F.3d 604, 623 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting 
consideration of dissenting opinions and remarking that, “[d]issenting judges enjoy something of 
the liberty of a gadfly, as the outcome does not in fact depend on what they say. Dissents of 
course often prove bellwethers, but until they do so, they may inspire but not guide”); In re 
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federal and state, have also suggested that the views of dissenting 
judges in dual-majority cases do count for the purposes of 
precedent.96 As the First Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, 
the Supreme Court . . . has moved away from the Marks formula. 
Since Marks, several members of the Court have indicated that 
whenever a decision is fragmented such that no single opinion has 
the support of five Justices, lower courts should examine the 
plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions to extract the 
principles that a majority has embraced.97 
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Corporation, the Supreme Court (in a unanimous opinion) explicitly 
endorsed and relied on the dissent-inclusive approach.98 Moses Cone 
concerned a federal district court’s refusal to exercise jurisdiction 
over a controversy; the question was whether the district court could 
properly stay a diversity action while a state-court suit involving the 
same issues and parties unfolded.99 In its argument for preserving the 
stay, the hospital in Moses Cone relied on the lead opinion of Will v. 
Calvert.100 Recall that in this dual-majority decision the Supreme 
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision, which 
 
Kozeny, 236 F.3d 615, 620 (10th Cir. 2000) (following the test from the lead opinion in Will v. 
Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978) as binding precedent, when a majority made up of 
dissenters and a concurrer in that case formed a majority in favor of a different test); Ass’n of 
Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246, 1255 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (declining to 
follow the agreement between dissenting and concurring justices in E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 
498 (1998) and stating that “dissenting votes have no precedential authority”); Sexton v. 
Kennedy, 523 F.2d 1311, 1314 (6th Cir. 1975) (following the plurality opinion of Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), where the dissenting and concurring justices agreed on an 
alternative view). 
 96.  See, e.g., Wright v. North Carolina, 787 F.3d 256, 268–69 (4th Cir. 2015) (following a 
line of reasoning from Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) that was endorsed by concurring 
and dissenting justices, and rejecting the district court’s attempt to follow the plurality opinion 
of Vieth); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005) (following the line of 
agreement between concurring and dissenting justices in Vieth); Unity Real Estate Co. v. 
Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 659 (3d Cir. 1999) (taking agreement between the concurrence of one 
and the dissent of four in E. Enters. as binding law); Yankee Atomic Elec. Co. v. United States, 
112 F.3d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (following the concurrence and dissent from Winstar v. United 
States., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)); Minucci v. Agrama, 868 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989) (treating 
the rationale from the concurrence and dissent of Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 
(1978) as the majority view); In re Det. of Reyes, 184 Wash. 2d 340, 346 (2015) (taking 
agreement between concurring and dissenting justices in a plurality decision as binding 
precedent). 
 97.  United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2006) (the opinion goes on to list 
several Supreme Court cases that have applied the dissent-inclusive method that I endorse 
here).  
 98.  460 U.S. 1 (1983).  
 99.  Id. at 7–8. 
 100.  Id. at 16–17. 
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had enjoined the district court’s stay order.101 The lead opinion of Will 
relied on Brillhart v. Excess Insurance102 to support its argument that 
federal district courts have considerable discretion over their own 
dockets.103 The justices in the plurality gave little weight to the 
previous case of Colorado River Water Conservation v. United States104 
—which, concerning the same kind of jurisdictional question, would 
seem to have been on point for the purposes of Will, and which both 
the concurring and dissenting opinions took to be controlling.105 In the 
Moses Cone case, the hospital contended that Will’s lead opinion had 
served to undermine or modify the test set out in Colorado River.106 
However, both the concurring and dissenting opinions in Will had 
endorsed (an expanded version of) the Colorado River test and had 
determined that this test should govern the jurisdictional dispute at 
hand.107 Figure 2 illustrates the scenario in broad strokes. 
Figure 2. The Will v. Calvert Decision.108 
 
 101.  Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978). 
 102.  316 U.S. 491 (1942). 
 103.  Will, 437 U.S., at 662–65. 
 104.  424 U.S. 800 (1976). 
 105.  Will, 437 U.S. at 668, 672–73. 
 106.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1983). 
 107.  See id. at 17, 23–24. 
 108.  There was a second, very brief, dissenting opinion in Will, by Chief Justice Burger. 
However, Burger expressed “general agreement” with the main dissenting opinion (by Justice 
Brennan) and signed onto Brennan’s opinion. 437 U.S. at 668. 
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The Moses Cone Court, rejecting the hospital’s arguments, 
explained: 
it is clear that a majority of the Court reaffirmed the Colorado 
River test in Calvert. Justice Rehnquist’s [lead] opinion 
commanded only four votes. It was opposed by the dissenting 
opinion, in which four justices concluded that the Calvert District 
Court’s stay was impermissible under Colorado River. . . . Justice 
Blackmun, although concurring in the judgment, agreed with the 
dissent that Colorado River’s exceptional-circumstances test was 
controlling; he voted to remand to permit the District Court to 
apply the Colorado River factors in the first instance.109 
The Court went on to note that when the Court of Appeals 
decided the Will case on remand, it “correctly recognized that the 
[Supreme Court dissent and concurrence] formed a majority to 
require application of the Colorado River test.”110 The justices in 
Moses Cone moreover asserted that Will reaffirmed (through the 
concurrence-dissent alignment) Colorado River, which suggests that 
the Court viewed the rationale shared by the concurrence and dissent 
as possessing binding precedential force.111 And, the Moses Cone 
Court endorsed the court of appeals’ treatment of the Will case on 
remand,112 explaining that the court of appeals correctly followed the 
concurring and dissenting opinions from the Supreme Court’s Will v. 
Calvert decision insofar as those opinions agreed with one another 
and mutually disagreed with the lead opinion.113 
The Moses Cone Court could have said simply that the Court’s 
decision in Will held no precedential weight and that accordingly 
Colorado River stood as if it were untouched by Will. Instead, the 
Court treated Will itself as a binding precedent that both reaffirmed 
Colorado River and expanded the Colorado River test. As the Moses 
Cone Court explained, 
[t]he state-versus-federal-law factor was of ambiguous relevance in 
Colorado River. In Calvert, however, both the four-vote dissenting 
 
 109.  Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 17. 
 110.  Id.  
 111.  A court or opinion is in a position to “reaffirm” some holding only if it has authority 
over that piece of law—authority to either overrule it or back it up, in which case it becomes 
another precedent with the same ratio. Lower courts cannot “reaffirm” the holdings of higher 
courts, nor can a dissenting judge on her own reaffirm the holding of a past case. 
 112.  Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Will, 586 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 113.  Moses Cone, 460 U.S. at 17. 
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opinion and Justice Blackmun’s opinion concurring in the 
judgment pointed out that the case involved issues of federal law. . . 
. It is equally apparent that this case involves federal issues.114 
Accordingly, “[b]esides the four factors expressly discussed in 
Colorado River, there is another that emerges from Calvert—the fact 
that federal law provides the rule of decision on the merits.”115 The 
Moses Cone Court applied the expanded test, reasoning along the 
same lines as the dissent in Will that “the presence of federal-law 
issues must always be a major consideration weighing against 
surrender.”116 In Moses Cone, the Supreme Court both asserted that 
dissenting rationales can contribute to the binding force of a case and 
followed the concurrence-dissent alignment in its Will decision as 
binding precedent. The Supreme Court has applied or endorsed the 
same method in several other cases.117 Although the Court seems to 
accept the legitimacy of the dissent-inclusive approach, it has not 
offered any kind of sustained explanation or justification for it. Part of 
my aim here is to fill this gap. 
C. Alternative Possibilities for Plurality Decisions 
In this section I present and evaluate alternative approaches to 
the precedential effect of plurality decisions. 
1. The Anti-Plurality Approach 
 a. No Precedential Effect for Plurality Decisions 
Many commentators have thrown up their hands, insisting that 
there is no principled or coherent way in which courts might follow 
 
 114.  Id. at 24. 
 115.  Id. at 23. 
 116.  Id. at 26.  
 117.  See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 413–14, 483 
(2006) (suggesting that majority agreement on principle in Vieth is authoritative, where the 
majority includes concurrers and dissenters); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280–81 
(2001) (suggesting that agreement between concurring and dissenting justices in Guardians 
Assn. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582 (1983) is authoritative); Vasquez v. 
Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (interpreting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) according to the 
dissent-inclusive approach); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984) (including the 
dissenting opinion of Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) in the precedent calculus). 
Note that Vasquez’s interpretation of Rose is a special case because, although the dissent in 
Rose rejected the judgment of the Court, it explicitly signed onto certain parts of the lead 
opinion—and it was one of those parts (Part II) that Vasquez took as controlling. Nevertheless, 
three justices in Vasquez rejected the authority of Part II from Rose’s lead opinion on the 
grounds that it “was not joined by five justices who also joined in the judgment.” Vasquez, 474 
U.S. at 270 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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plurality decisions as precedent. For example, according to Mark 
Thurmon and others, it is “impossible to avoid something in the 
nature of arbitrary rules to meet cases in which several [opinions] are 
delivered.”118 Some commentators simply assume that pluralities do 
not constitute binding precedent of any sort.119 
As I have already argued, however, if federal courts were to deny 
precedential effect to dual-majority decisions, they would act 
inconsistently with settled jurisprudence concerning the 
holdings/dicta distinction.120 Second, as I discuss below, stare decisis 
serves several worthy values, including judicial guidance, 
predictability, efficiency, and equality.121 If courts were to reject the 
precedential effect of a subset of opinions, we would miss out on 
benefits that the doctrine of precedent can provide. Third, some 
commentators have argued that appellate courts are not entitled to 
issue non-precedential decisions.122 Some have gone so far as to 
suggest that non-precedential decisions issued by Article III courts 
are unconstitutional.123 If that is right, then, if we deprived plurality 
decisions of precedential effect, it would be impossible for courts to 
fulfill their precedent-setting duty in the event of a plurality decision. 
If, on the other hand, precedent-bound courts insisted on respecting 
plurality decisions as precedent, they would enable precedent-setting 
courts to fulfill their duties. 
 b. No Plurality Decisions 
According to Linda Novak, “[t]he bulk of commentary on the 
subject has unequivocally condemned the practice [of plurality 
decisions], stressing the erosion of Supreme Court credibility and 
authority as a source of moral and legal leadership.”124 Some have 
suggested that we should get rid of plurality decisions altogether, 
possibly through the imposition of a rule that would prohibit courts 
 
 118.  Thurmon, supra note 67, at 427 (quoting Cross & Harris). 
 119.  See, e.g., Corley, supra note 6, at 196 (asserting that, “[w]hen the Supreme Court fails 
to generate a controlling precedent [as it does in the case of plurality decisions], the result 
arguably is an erosion of the Court’s credibility and authority as a source of legal leadership”). 
 120.  See discussion supra Section II.A. 
 121.  See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 122.  See, e.g., Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 85, at 1069 (“[G]ranting judges the power 
to resolve cases without creating any precedent at all threatens to undermine the rule of law . . . 
.”); Corley, supra note 6, at 185 (stating that the Supreme Court has a duty to “provid[e] final, 
national answers to important legal questions”).  
 123.  See infra, note 170.  
 124.  Novak, supra note 70, at 759. 
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from issuing pluralities.125 Richard Re encourages courts to form 
“compromise majorities” when they would otherwise be inclined to 
issue plurality decisions.126 
Despite the difficulties that plurality decisions pose for precedent-
bound courts, I do not share the negative view toward pluralities that 
many others have expressed. Plurality decisions exemplify, and 
illustrate for the public and legal community alike, the complexity and 
uncertainty inherent in adjudication. Judicial decisions may be 
deceptive insofar as they conceal the inescapable difficulties of 
judicial decisionmaking.127 Moreover, empirical studies have found 
that lay people are more receptive to judicial decisions that 
acknowledge uncertainty and indeterminacy.128 
In the context of plurality decisions, no matter how certain the 
rhetoric of any single opinion, a court wears its uncertainty on its 
sleeve, exhibiting the ambiguities and complexities of the law. 
Plurality decisions inevitably lay out competing legal theories, 
revealing the fraught and difficult nature of judicial decisionmaking. 
As others have argued, American judicial decisions gain legitimacy, 
actual and perceived, from this kind of transparency.129 Moreover, 
 
 125.  See, e.g., Corley, supra note 10, at 570 (raising the question of whether “plurality 
decisions [should] be discouraged by changing the institutional rules and norms of the [U.S. 
Supreme] Court”); Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-Majority Judicial 
Decisions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 370 (1968); Ledebur, supra note 6, at 914 (advocating for a rule that 
“would not allow any Justice to write a concurring opinion in addition to the single opinion of 
the Court”); Weins, supra note 16, at 873 (stating that “[n]obody likes plurality decisions,” and 
remarking that “[h]opefully, the era of plurality precedents will soon be brought to a close.”). 
 126.  Re, supra note 59.  
 127.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral 
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 75–76 (2011) (arguing that “[t]he unflinching certitude characteristic of judicial opinions . . . 
provokes [public] suspicion”). 
 128.  See Dan Simon & Nicholas Scurich, Lay Judgments of Judicial Decision Making, 8 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 709, 710, 721 (finding that “[l]ay audiences . . . appear to appreciate a 
forthright exposition of the difficulties inherent in deciding human affairs, despite judicial 
protestations to the contrary,” and that people are more willing to accept decisions “that admit 
to . . . complexity and underdeterminacy”). 
 129.  For example, consider Judge Easterbrook’s contention in Matter of Krynicki, 983 F.2d 
74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992), that “[a]ny step that withdraws an element of the judicial process from 
public view makes the ensuing decision look more like fiat.” As MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. 
LASSER, JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSPARENCY AND 
LEGITIMACY 3–4 puts it, “[i]ndividually signed opinions (including concurrences and dissents), 
the disclosure of judicial votes, the forthright recognition of interpretive difficulties, the candid 
discussion of judicial legal development, and public judicial debate over substantive policy 
issues combine to foster judicial accountability and control, to encourage democratic debate and 
deliberation, and thus to accord well-deserved legitimacy to American judicial power.” See also 
id., at 21–22, 248–50, 300–03, 306, 312–13, 338–40. This is not to say, however, that the American 
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judicial decisions and judges themselves are made accountable this 
way; the views and sensibilities of not only the court as a whole but 
also individual judges are on display so that readers can evaluate 
them individually.130 
Finally, if plurality decisions were either prohibited or deprived of 
binding force, this would give judges incentive to conceal or hold back 
important parts of their reasoning. For example, consider an 
adjudicative scenario where a judge strongly believes that a particular 
legal theory governs the dispute, but disagrees with fellow judges over 
the result that the theory dictates given the facts of the case. In an 
anti-plurality regime, she might join with the judges who agree with 
her theory even though she believes that their application of the 
theory is mistaken: expressing this kind of false agreement might be 
the only way her preferred principles would gain binding force. Some 
might consider this effect to be desirable, since it would make for 
more unified decisions and greater actual or apparent judicial 
compromise. But since I place a high value on transparency and 
believe that litigants, as well as the legal community and public, have a 
right to know what judges are up to, I believe that we have more to 
lose than to gain from an anti-plurality regime.131 
Plurality decisions showcase unsettled points of law and illuminate 
 
form of transparency is necessary to judicial legitimacy. Other systems achieve legitimacy by 
other means. For example, French judicial decisions are short and one-sided, unsigned, and 
leave no room for concurrences and dissents. The French judicial system is not illegitimate for 
that, but it does depend on other sources of legitimacy, which the U.S. system lacks: in France, 
unlike the U.S., judges receive rigorous and extensive formal training, the system of judicial 
selection means that judges are more representative of the people, and lawmaking authority is 
reserved to the political branch. See id., at 300–03, 332. However, some commentators have 
suggested that terse and cryptic judicial decisions lack legitimacy precisely because they do not 
reveal the views of individual judges and disagreement among them. For example, commenting 
on the style of decisions issued by the European Court of Justice, Joseph Weiler says that “the 
Court should abandon the cryptic, Cartesian style which still characterizes many of its decisions 
and move to the more discursive, analytic, and conversational style associated more with the 
common law world”; Weiler also advocates “for the introduction of separate and dissenting 
opinions,” since they “force the majority opinion to be reasoned in an altogether more profound 
and communicative fashion”; the dissent in particular, says Weiler, “often produces the 
paradoxical effect of legitimating the majority because it becomes evident that alternative views 
were considered even if ultimately rejected.” The Judicial Après Nice, Gráinne De Búrca & 
Joseph Weiler (eds.), THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 215, 225 (Oxford UP, 2001). 
 130.  See LASSER, supra note 129, at 315, 338, 344. 
 131.  The state of Delaware provides an example of one form of anti-plurality regime. The 
Delaware Supreme Court (which is the only appellate court of the state) follows a strong 
unanimity norm, and only very rarely issues plurality decisions. See David A. Skeel, The 
Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 147 (1997). Skeel suggests 
that, “[i]n striking contrast to a nonunaminous regime, the unanimity norm [discourages] the 
justices [from] articulating their differing views on the appropriate doctrinal approach.” Id. 
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different paths that the law might take. These decisions tend to expose 
the strongest reasons on both sides of disputes; accordingly, pluralities 
not only reveal just how close a case can be but also instruct future 
litigants on the most promising lines of reasoning to pursue.132 
Plurality decisions give us a better understanding of the various views 
represented on a single court and how those views interact. 
Moreover, when judges issue multiple opinions in a case, they 
often respond to one another’s positions: the publication of these 
conversations puts on display part of the adjudicative process—in 
particular disagreement and dialogue among judges, even among 
those who agree regarding judgment—that would be more likely to be 
concealed if judges were compelled to issue a majority opinion in 
each case. Some commentators suggest that courts should avoid 
issuing plurality decisions because they give the impression of judicial 
discord.133 However, plurality decisions may contribute positively to 
the legitimacy, both real and perceived, of the adjudicative process. 
During his tenure as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, 
Charles Evan Hughes advocated for transparency and urged judges to 
record their individual convictions despite the cost of disunion, since 
judges “are not there simply to decide cases, but to decide them as 
they think they should be decided, . . . it is better that their 
independence should be maintained and recognized than that 
unanimity should be secured through its sacrifice.”134 
Finally, many important plurality decisions are already on the 
books and courts are likely to continue issuing plurality decisions 
despite anti-plurality sentiment. Moreover, precedent-bound courts 
continue to seek precedential value in plurality decisions, even while 
lacking the methodological guidance to follow pluralities in a 
confident and consistent manner. Current judicial practice suggests 
that either outlawing plurality decisions or directing courts to ignore 
them would conflict with judicial sensibilities. 
 
 132.  See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 90, at 9 (arguing that, “for lower courts, the 
parties, and interested bystanders—concurring and dissenting opinions are important guides to 
the dynamic ‘meaning’ of a decision by the Court”). Moreover, Bernadette Meyler, Law, 
Literature, and History: The Love Triangle, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LAW AND LITERATURE 160, 
170–71 (eds. Elizabeth Anker and Bernadette Meyler, Oxford UP 2017), suggests that cases 
with multiple opinions offer a valuable pedagogical tool in the classroom, since they illustrate 
the contingency of judicial decisionmaking. 
 133.  See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 16, at 281 (cautioning judges against issuing separate 
opinions, “whether dissenting or concurring,” since these “give the appearance of conflict”). 
 134.  CHARLES EVAN HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
FOUNDATION, METHODS AND ACHIEVEMENTS, 67–68 (1928). 
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2. The Lead Opinion Fiat Model 
Some scholars maintain that judges should afford precedential 
effect to the lead opinions of plurality decisions.135 Advocates of this 
solution seem to be motivated by the pressure to settle on some 
method for dealing with pluralities in order to clear up the confusion, 
as well as by the belief that no principled method is available. The 
proposal that courts should simply follow the lead opinion as if it 
were a majority opinion does have the advantage of simplicity and 
practicality. However, the appeal of this approach seems to end there. 
For many, the principles or theories provided in a lead opinion are 
suspect, since no majority of judges necessarily endorsed them, and 
most judges might have gone out of their way, even, to oppose them. 
As James Bloom has observed, adopting lead opinions as binding 
precedent would “render meaningless the fact that the Justices 
themselves thought the issues were too important to compromise by 
joining a majority opinion, thereby endorsing an interpretation of the 
law with which they disagree.”136 
3. The Predictive-Result Model 
On the predictive-result approach, a court faced with a precedent 
that takes the form of a plurality decision should run the facts of the 
dispute at hand through the reasoning of each opinion issued in the 
plurality case. The court then totals the results as if they were votes 
for each side, and decides the given dispute accordingly.137 Advocates 
of the predictive approach generally exclude dissenting opinions from 
the process,138 but the inclusion of dissents is a theoretical 
 
 135.  See, e.g., Douglas J. Whaley, Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of No-Clear-
Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 TEX. L. REV. 370, 376 (1968) (arguing that the opinion that 
receives the most votes from non-dissenting judges should be taken as the binding one); see also 
Bloom, supra note 10, at 1377 (2008) (“While some have argued that plurality [i.e., lead] 
opinions are merely persuasive, the more compelling view is that the rationale of plurality 
opinions is more than merely persuasive, even if it does not rise to the level of binding 
precedent.”); Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 
24 U. CHI. L. REV. 99 (1956) (claiming that the lead opinion is typically treated as binding, as if 
it were a normal majority opinion). 
 136.  Bloom, supra note 10, at 1408. 
 137.  See, e.g., Thurmon, supra note 67. The predictive approach can be understood in a 
retrospective way—predicting the outcome that the precedent-setting court would have reached 
given the facts of the current dispute—or in a contemporaneous way—predicting the outcome 
that the precedent-setting court would reach, given its present composition. According to the 
latter version, the opinions of the plurality case serve as nothing more than indicators of how 
the current judges might decide. Either version of the predictive results model is vulnerable to (I 
think fatal) criticisms. 
 138.  See, e.g., Bloom, supra note 10, at 1409 (claiming that lower federal courts following 
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possibility.139 When the “narrowest grounds” opinion generates results 
that a majority of the precedent-setting court would endorse, Marks 
supplies a methodological shortcut for the predictive result 
approach.140 A precedent-bound court need not bother running facts 
through multiple opinions if the narrowest grounds opinion would 
generate the same result. 
Others have critiqued the predictive method in detail and it is 
beyond the scope of my efforts here to do the same, but I will point 
out a few of the more salient problems. As Dorf explains, the 
prediction model “over-emphasiz[es] the role of individual judges,” 
and in the process “undermines the rule of law” and “the ideal of the 
impartial judge.”141 Courts have rejected the predictive approach on 
the same grounds.142 Kornhauser and Sager argue that the ability of 
the predictive model “to deliver an outcome that will enjoy the 
support of a majority of the Justices depends on the Justices holding 
fast to the views that have placed them in a state of dissensus.”143 That 
assumption presupposes a noncollegial conception of the Court as 
only “the sum of its warring parts, and neither anticipates nor 
contributes towards the resolution of doctrinal disarray.”144 
The main merit claimed for the predictive result method is its 
predictive value. That claim assumes that higher courts will not follow 
stare decisis in the context of their own past plurality decisions, but 
instead that the judges will decide subsequent disputes consistently 
with their own individual approach to previous disputes (or that 
higher courts will themselves follow the predictive results method). 
However, the Supreme Court respects stare decisis even when the 
 
Supreme Court plurality decisions should “apply both [the plurality and concurring] opinions, 
[since courts can then] feel confident that the Supreme Court would have come to the same 
conclusion.”). See also Cacace, supra note 73, at 130–31 (suggesting that courts should look to 
dissents only if applying all of the non-dissenting opinions fails to generate a result). For a 
sophisticated variation of the predictive approach (which also excludes dissenting opinions), see 
Williams, supra note 6. 
 139.  Re, supra note 59, at 34 (evaluating the merits of this possibility, which he calls the “all 
opinions approach”). 
 140.  See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying material. 
 141.  Michael Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 680–82, 715 
(1995). 
 142.  See, e.g., Polk County, Ga. v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 262 F.2d 486, 489 (5th Cir. 
1959) (asserting that the predictive approach operates by “psychoanalyz[ing] state court judges 
rather than [rationalizing] state court decisions”).  
 143.  Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 90, at 47–48. 
 144.  Id. at 48. 
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relevant past case is a plurality decision, and its prevailing approach is 
not the predictive one.145 
4. The Result-Only Model 
The result-only approach to plurality decisions represents a 
common perspective on how courts ought to deal with pluralities. On 
the result-only model (hereinafter the result model), a plurality 
decision is binding but only with respect to its specific facts and 
result.146 This means that a court would be bound by the plurality 
decision only if it were to confront “a factual situation that does not 
differ in any material way from that before the plurality Court.”147 
Commentators and courts alike have suggested that the result 
model is in keeping with the operation of precedent in non-plurality 
cases and with the traditional distinction between ratio and dicta. 
According to Novak, “it seems clear that lower courts must adhere at 
the minimum to the principle of ‘result’ stare decisis, which mandates 
that any specific result espoused by a clear majority of the Court 
should be controlling in substantially identical cases.”148 Bloom 
contends that “even many of the harshest critics of plurality opinions 
agree that the results of plurality decisions are binding . . . .”149 
According to the U.S. Courts government website, a lead opinion is 
not binding, nor are the rationales contained in that opinion, since 
neither opinion nor rationales received majority support; however, 
plurality cases are precedential “in terms of the [result].”150 
The result model of precedent is untenable. On the result view, a 
precedent-bound court is free to adopt its own rationales or grounds 
of decision, but must reach a result that is consistent with the facts and 
result of the precedent case.151 But what does this kind of consistency 
 
 145.  See supra II.B. As Dorf, supra note 141, at 683–84, notes, “a judge who dissents in one 
case will nonetheless generally apply its principles in a later case, recognizing that as precedent 
it stands on an equal footing with cases decided before she became a judge.”  
 146.  Some scholars have endorsed the result-only view in general (not just in the plurality 
context). See, e.g., Arthur Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40.2 YALE L.J. 
161, 162 (1930) (claiming that “[t]he reason which the judge gives for his decision is never the 
binding part of the precedent”); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning 
“Präjudizienrecht in Amerika”, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 210 (1933) (asserting that “[i]t is the 
decision itself which must be followed and not the opinion”). 
 147.  Thurmon, supra note 67, at 455 n.166. 
 148.  Novak, supra note 70, at 779.  
 149.  Bloom, supra note 10, at 1412.  
 150.  Glossary – U.S. v. Alvarez, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
educational-resources/educational-activities/glossary-us-v-alvarez. 
 151.  See James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 IND. L.J. 41 (1979); Novak, supra 
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amount to? To determine whether a new case is the same as a past 
case for the purposes of stare decisis, we would need to know which 
facts are important and to what degree. But figuring that out would 
require engaging with the reasoning behind the past decision. 
For example, recall the scenario of a mother deciding whether to 
allow her daughter to take up competitive gymnastics. Suppose that 
the mother has other children in addition to the aspiring gymnast. 
And suppose that gymnastics lessons are expensive. Is this a material 
fact in the mother’s decision? We can ascertain its relevant only if we 
know which principles govern her decision. If the mother considers 
fair distribution of family resources across children as a guiding 
principle, then the cost of gymnastics lessons would be a material fact. 
However, if distributive justice principles do not factor into the 
mother’s decision, then the cost of the lessons would be immaterial. 
As Williams has explained, “[l]ooking to the precedent court’s own 
explanation of the reasoning through which it reached its result . . . 
provid[es] a set of criteria through which to assess the materiality of 
any discernible factual similarities and differences between the two 
cases.”152 
By definition, in a plurality case no single line of reasoning or legal 
theory is present. Plurality decisions offer legal theories that are in 
tension with and often even contradict one another. The lead opinion 
might have based its decision on facts x, y, and z, whereas the 
concurring opinion might have determined facts x and y to be 
immaterial and instead relied on facts z, p, and q. This is exactly what 
we should expect of decisions that are based on alternative theories. 
On the result model, courts are bound (and only bound) by the facts 
and result of a past plurality decision. These features, however, cannot 
be applied to new cases (or else have extremely limited applicability) 
in isolation from the past court’s reasons for reaching its result.153 
 
note 70, at 7 (explaining that a court abiding by result stare decisis confines the “precedential 
value of a decision to its specific result and declin[es] to regard any particular line of reasoning 
as authoritative”). 
 152.  Williams, supra note 6, at 824; see also Steven Burton, Comment on “Empty Ideas”: 
Logical Positivist Analyses of Equality and Rules, 91 YALE L.J. 1136, 1144 (1982) (explaining 
that the purposes underlying a court’s decision indicate which facts were material to that 
decision); Dorf, supra note 78, at 2033; Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. 
L REV. 741, 746–47 (1993) (“We cannot fully describe the outcome in case X if we do not know 
something about the reasons that count in its favor.”). 
 153.  See Williams, supra note 6, at 824 (discussing the result-only approach as 
“unworkable” because it does not provide a means of specifying “precisely which facts in the 
precedent case should matter to the precedent-following court in determining the binding effect 
VARSAVA_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2019  7:32 PM 
2019] THE ROLE OF DISSENTS IN THE FORMATION OF PRECEDENT 325 
Given that the lead and concurring opinions relied on different 
rationales for the result, a precedent-bound court would be at a loss 
for determining which facts are material for the purposes of 
precedent. 
If the facts of the case to be decided are identical to the facts of 
the plurality precedent to be followed, then the court need not worry 
about which facts are material. The facts of a new case, however, will 
almost never be exactly the same as those of a past case. (And if the 
facts were actually the same, then a court would be bound by the law 
of the case or res judicata rather than stare decisis). 
Thurmon applies the result method to the plurality decision of 
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, a Supreme Court case that considered 
whether John Cleland’s novel Fanny Hill was protected from 
censorship under the First Amendment. Thurmon maintains that the 
rationales or legal theories provided in the case’s opinions are not 
binding, concluding that “Memoirs’s imperative authority is limited to 
its result that Fanny Hill is not obscene.”154 His analysis suggests that 
Memoirs would serve as binding precedent in a subsequent case only 
if the exact same question—the status of Fanny Hill—were under 
dispute. On the result model of stare decisis, plurality decisions will 
rarely if ever exert force over subsequent controversies.155 The result 
model, then, is not actually a model of precedent at all. As Larry 
Alexander puts it, “restricting a rule to the facts of the precedent case 
is inconsistent with constraint by precedent,”156 since the set of 
subsequent cases that would be constrained by the supposed 
precedent would be empty. 
 
of an earlier precedent”); see also Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 85, at 1055 (explaining 
that, “facts, material or otherwise, do not speak for themselves. . . . Judges do not merely 
identify material facts; they develop legal reasoning that applies the facts and that eventually 
reaches a particular result”); Dorf, supra note 78, at 2036 (citing EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF 
THE COMMON LAW 53 (1988)) (describing the result-only model as incoherent, “because every 
material fact in a case can be stated at different levels of generality, each level of generality will 
tend to yield a different rule, and no mechanical rules can be devised to determine the level of 
generality intended by the precedent court.”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and 
Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 764 (1988) (“The relevant facts . . . do not 
identify and classify themselves . . . .”). 
 154.  Thurmon, supra note 67, at 458. 
 155.  See Novak, supra note 70, at 18 (“When a decision is cited for its ‘specific result,’ it is 
regarded as obligating subsequent courts to reach a similar outcome in a substantially identical 
fact situation.”); see also Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 85, at 1066–67 (“[If judges followed 
the method prescribed by the result-only model], cases [would] almost always be distinguishable 
based upon factual differences that most would agree have little or no relevance in terms of 
providing a material basis for different legal treatment.”). 
 156.  Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20 (1989).  
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5. Relaxing the Result Model 
We could relax the pure result model to construct a low-level rule 
approach, where a plurality decision stands for a rule that the lead 
and concurring opinions agree on, whether explicitly or implicitly. This 
is how some courts and commentators interpret the Marks “narrowest 
grounds” framework. By low-level rule I mean a proposition that is 
less abstract or general that what I have been referring to as 
principles, rationales, or theories. For example, the proposition a book 
that depicts sex between non-married individuals in a positive light is 
obscene and therefore prohibited is a low-level rule, which 
decisionmakers could attempt to justify by any number of higher-
order rationales. The low-level rule model assumes that the lead and 
concurring opinions agreed on a rule. Although we should not take 
such agreement for granted, in some plurality cases agreement in the 
form of a low-level rule could be found or generated. 
For example, Bloom lists a number of cases that apparently 
followed plurality decisions for their results only; the propositions he 
offers as “results” are actually low-level rules that have applicability 
beyond the facts of the plurality case itself.157 For example, in Ace 
Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Federal Crop Ins. Corp., the Eighth 
Circuit cited United States v. Winstar Corp. (a Supreme Court plurality 
decision) “for the proposition that damages could be awarded against 
a federal agency for breach of contract despite the fact that Congress 
required the federal agency to breach the contract at issue.”158 This is a 
proposition that the judges in both the plurality and concurring 
factions in Winstar must have accepted, given their shared conclusion 
in that case. The proposition has sufficient generality that it would be 
applicable to sets of facts beyond the particular facts present in 
Winstar; accordingly, if Winstar is taken to stand for this proposition, 
then the case has some degree of precedential authority. However, on 
the relaxed result model, given that the various opinions concurring in 
the judgment in Winstar did not agree on any rationale for the breach 
of contract rule, no rationale can claim precedential force.159 
 
 157.  Bloom, supra note 10, at 1407 n.257. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Novak, supra note 70, at 770, provides an example with a similar form: “Lower courts 
have regarded [the U.S. Supreme Court’s] determination in [Cannon v. University of Chicago] 
that title IX impliedly creates a private right of action as authoritative, even though the Court 
reached this result on the basis of several different rationales.” Each of the opinions that agreed 
on the final judgment in Cannon at least had to agree that people have a private right of action 
under title IX, even if the opinions disagreed as to why this right of action exists. Because the 
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Why not accept the low-level rule approach to plurality decisions? 
For one, under the low-level rule approach the precedential reach of 
plurality cases would still be very limited. As others have explained, if 
the rationales or principles supporting a court’s judgment in some 
case do not carry precedential weight, then subsequent adjudicators 
will be bound by that case only in the event of a dispute with 
exceedingly similar facts.160 
Second, when courts generate rules of decision, these rules are 
meant to serve some legal or moral principles, and the rules are 
justified on the grounds of those principles. In the famous case of 
Riggs v. Palmer, for example, the New York Court of Appeals held 
that a person who murders his testator in order to effectuate the will 
is not entitled to his inheritance.161 As a justification for this rule, the 
court depended on the intuitive principle that the law should not 
reward evil-doing.162 In the case of a plurality decision, however, even 
if a majority agrees upon a low-level rule, that agreement does not 
reflect deeper agreement at the level of rationale or principle. 
Because such a rule does not enjoy the support of a justification that 
the court could agree on, one might reasonably question the 
legitimacy of affording the rule precedential status. 
*** 
In this Part, I have argued that the holdings of dual-majority 
decisions are a product, in part, of the reasoning expressed in 
dissenting opinions. I showed how this view is consistent with the 
prevailing conception of the holdings/dicta distinction. I also 
delineated and critiqued several alternative approaches to the 
precedential value of plurality decisions. 
III. DUAL MAJORITIES AND THE PRIORITY OF PRINCIPLES 
In this Part, I argue that principles are integral to effective, 
authoritative, and legitimate adjudication, and on that basis I defend 
the principle-centric, dissent-inclusive view. 
 
point of agreement has applicability beyond the facts of Cannon, that point can constrain, to 
some extent, subsequent adjudicators. 
 160.  See Cacace, supra note 73, at 104. 
 161.  Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
 162.  Id. at 190. 
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A. Stare Decisis Principles 
One might think that stare decisis itself provides the principles 
that would justify following low-level rules in the context of plurality 
decisions. The idea would be that we should follow rules from 
plurality decisions just because we should treat like cases alike, and 
following the rules would ensure that we do so. Stare decisis, however, 
is not a principle in and of itself, but rather a doctrine or policy that 
stands for, and is justified by, a set of principles—including judicial 
guidance and constraint, predictability, credibility or perceived 
legitimacy, efficiency, and equality or fairness.163 In the case of 
plurality decisions, these principles are best served by following 
majority-endorsed rationales. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to examine the stare decisis principles in detail,164 I do want to 
give some indication of the ways in which the dissent-inclusive 
approach to precedent supports the principles and objectives of stare 
decisis better than alternative approaches. 
1. Guidance, Constraint, and Predictability 
As we have already seen, the kind of low-level rules we can derive 
from plurality decisions would cover very few disputes.165 A principle 
 
 163.  For discussion of the judicial restraint function of stare decisis, see, e.g., Regents of 
Univ. of Mich. v. Titan Ins. Co., 791 NW.2d 897, 910 (Mich. 2010) (Weaver, J., concurring); 
Steven Burton, The Conflict Between Stare Decisis and Overruling in Constitutional 
Adjudication 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1687, 1697; Lewis F. Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial 
Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286, 287 (1990). For discussion of the predictability and 
reliance value of precedent, see, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL 
SCIENCES 29–30 (1930); NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 118–
19, 160–61 (2008); Goodhart, Precedent in English and Continental Law, 50 L.Q. REV. 40, 58 
(1934); David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent 38 VAND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985); 
Earl M. Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, N.C. L. REV. 367, 368 (1988); Radin, supra note 146. 
For discussion of credibility or perceived legitimacy as a justification for stare decisis, see, e.g., 
Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. 
REV. 571, 599–600 (1987); John Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 2 (1983). For discussion of judicial efficiency as a value of stare decisis, see, e.g., Westfield 
Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 797 N.E.2d 1256, 1273 (Ohio 2003) (Sweeney, J., dissenting); George v. 
Ericson, 736 A.2d 889, 893–94 (Conn. 1999); William Landes and Richard Posner, Legal 
Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 263 (1976). For 
discussion of the equality or formal justice value of precedent, see, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 116 (1977); Neil MacCormick, Why Cases Have Rationes and What 
These Are, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 155, 160 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) at 160. 
 164.  I discuss these values in more detail in How to Realize the Value of Stare Decisis: 
Options for Following Precedent, 30 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 62 (2018). 
 165.  For this reason, “[a]lthough precedents will necessarily constrain deciding courts, facts-
plus-outcome holdings leave courts with a great deal of flexibility.” Abramowicz & Stearns, 
supra note 85, at 1069. 
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or rationale for a low-level rule covers a wider range of scenarios, and 
accordingly can provide greater guidance to courts and other actors. 
Scholars have criticized the Court for issuing narrow, fact-specific 
rulings that fail to give useful guidance to lower courts and other 
participants in the legal system.166 For Frederick Schauer, when the 
Court neglects to support its decisions with broadly applicable norms, 
it “relinquishes the coordinating and certainty-providing benefits that 
justify the law itself.”167 
Schauer criticizes the Court’s plurality decisions on the same 
grounds, claiming that these decisions represent an abdication of the 
Court’s duty to guide subsequent actors.168 But Schauer’s two 
objectives—broader rulings and fewer pluralities—are in tension. 
When courts are inclined to issue plurality decisions, no majority 
agrees on a reasoning-plus-outcome bundle. If judges compromise 
and issue a majority-supported opinion, that opinion is likely to be 
highly fact-specific—providing guidance to courts and prospective 
litigants in only a very narrow set of scenarios. My dissent-inclusive 
approach supports the guidance and reliance function of judicial 
decisions, because it enables judges to establish norms with 
meaningful scope, such that they are likely to be applicable to future 
cases, even when those judges cannot agree on the outcome that the 
norms require in the precedent-setting dispute. 
Moreover, my review of the case law suggests that courts (in 
particular higher courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court) favor the 
dissent-inclusive approach and are moving away from alternatives.169 
This tendency creates expectations regarding how courts will treat 
plurality decisions going forward. So not to upset these expectations, 
courts should embrace the dissent-inclusive method. 
2. Perceived Legitimacy 
If an important part of the judiciary’s job is to articulate the law 
through judicial opinions—in other words, to issue decisions that 
 
 166.  See Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 SUP. CT. 
REV. 205, 207 (reporting “an increase in narrow and fact-specific rulings, rulings that may in 
theory produce the right outcome for the particular case before the Court, but which in practice 
gain little if anything in accuracy but nevertheless entail the cost of providing virtually no 
assistance for lower courts expected to make their decisions in light of what the Supreme Court 
has said, and for officials and citizens desiring to know what the law is as they plan their 
actions”). 
 167.  Id. at 229. 
 168.  Id. at 231. 
 169.  See discussion supra II.B. 
VARSAVA_MACROS (DO NOT DELETE) 6/6/2019  7:32 PM 
330 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 14 
subsequent courts can follow170—then we might think that judges 
would neglect their responsibilities if they were to issue decisions 
without establishing usable precedent. As Adam Steinman argues at 
length, “[s]ince our nation’s earliest days, the federal judiciary has 
claimed for itself ‘the province and duty . . . to say what the law is.’”171 
Robert Cover argues that there are two central functions of common-
law adjudication: dispute resolution and norm articulation.172 On my 
dissent-inclusive view of dual-majority decisions, adjudicators can 
make good on their duty to articulate legal norms even while being 
transparent about their points of disagreement. For this reason, the 
dissent-inclusive approach might be conducive to the stare decisis 
value of credibility or perceived legitimacy. 
3. Efficiency and Judicial Resources 
Approaches that deny or severely restrict the precedential effect 
of plurality decisions squander resources because they fail to 
capitalize on the judicial reasoning contained in these decisions. A 
great deal of labor goes into plurality decisions, with several often 
complex and lengthy opinions issued; on the dissent-inclusive model, 
principles or theories that gather majority support will have real 
currency in subsequent cases.173 
 
 170.  Commentators have often addressed this duty in discussions of unpublished, non-
precedential opinions. For example, the Eighth Circuit has held that a judicial rule (8th Circuit 
Rule 28A(i)) allowing for non-precedential opinions is unconstitutional, since the federal 
judiciary does not have the power to decide cases without also establishing precedent. 
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), opinion vacated on reh’g en banc, 235 
F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000). Writing for the Court, Judge Arnold asserted “that 8th Circuit Rule 
28A(i), insofar as it would allow us to avoid the precedential effect of our prior decisions, 
purports to expand the judicial power beyond the bounds of Article III, and is therefore 
unconstitutional.” Id. at 900. Approaches to plurality decisions that do not treat plurality 
decisions as binding, or that limit the binding force to the specific facts of the case (which 
effectively amounts to the same), suggest that the judiciary is entitled to make decisions that 
have little or no force beyond the particular case and moreover that subsequent courts are 
entitled to ignore those decisions. Accordingly, these approaches are subject to the same kinds 
of criticisms that have been leveled against courts for issuing unpublished, non-precedential 
opinions. 
 171.  Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of 
Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 VA. L. REV. 1737, 1738 (2013) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). 
 172.  Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and 
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1980). 
 173.  For a discussion of the labor- and resource-saving function of precedent (a function 
that can be realized only when courts have applicable precedents to follow), see William Landes 
& Richard Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 
263 (1976).  
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Moreover, if legal theories or standards provided in any opinion, 
whether or not dissenting, could constitute binding precedent 
(provided those standards received majority endorsement), then we 
should expect higher quality reasoning than in an alternative regime 
where only the reasoning presented in opinions endorsing the 
majority outcome could possibly be authoritative. On the dissent-
inclusive approach, all rationales would be competing with one 
another for majority support, rather than just those rationales 
presented in opinions that endorse the majority conclusion. 
Accordingly, compared to alternatives, the dissent-inclusive method 
gives dissenting judges increased incentive to present compelling 
principles and theories, and makes more room for cooperation and 
dialogue among decisionmakers, since disagreement on result does 
not preclude the legal significance of agreement on principle or 
theory. 
The dissent-inclusive approach would also help to balance 
responsibility across judges, because a judge’s views, no matter her 
ultimate disposition in a case, might reaffirm or establish legal norms. 
4. Fairness 
On the one hand, we might think that, given two cases with very 
similar facts, it is only fair that litigants receive the same outcome in 
each case; on the other hand, though, we might think that it is more 
important for fairness that litigants are treated according to the same 
principles. On the latter view, if the majority of a court in Case A 
followed some principle, X, in its treatment of the litigants, then the 
court should follow principle X in its treatment of similarly situated 
litigants in Case B. If Case A was a plurality decision, then the results 
of the two cases might differ. To see why, consider again the model 
dual-majority decision illustrated in Figure 1 above.174 A precedent-
constrained court would be required to follow rationales D, E, and F 
in the event of a case with the same facts. However, in the precedent 
case, four of five judges applying D, E, and F reached a decision in 
favor of the defendant (whereas the disposition of the case was in 
favor of the plaintiff). 
This might be a counterintuitive result of the dissent-inclusive 
view. It would be cold comfort for the plaintiff in Case B to assure 
him that, even though he lost his case and the past plaintiff won on 
 
 174.  See supra Part I.A. 
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the same facts, he was treated according to the set of principles that 
was endorsed by a majority of the court in the past case. In theory, 
then, my preferred approach comes with a fairness cost.175 
In reality, though, facts do not repeat themselves. The dispute in 
Case B might look a lot like the dispute in Case A, but the disputes 
couldn’t be exactly the same. Suppose (as illustrated in Figure 1) that 
two factions of decisionmakers in Case A reached different results but 
applied the same principles (D, E, and F). The series of opinions in 
that case gives some indication to the precedent-constrained court of 
the tipping point with respect to those principles: the threshold at 
which they no longer point to a decision in favor of the defendant. On 
the facts of Case A, the applicable principles favored the defendant 
(at least according to four of the five judges who endorsed them), but 
presumably just barely (assuming that the judge who voted in favor of 
the plaintiff on the basis of principles D, E, and F had a plausible 
argument for doing so). 
The precedent-constrained court would consider whether the facts 
in Case B are stronger or weaker for plaintiff’s case compared to the 
facts of Case A, in light of the majority-supported rationales from 
Case A. Even a slight factual difference across Cases A and B might 
justify a different outcome in Case B, since Case A was likely a 
difficult, borderline case (as evidenced by the dual-majority decision). 
Accordingly, although two cases that appear very similar might 
receive different outcomes on the dissent-inclusive approach, the 
differential treatment might be justified by some relevant, even if 
slight, difference between the facts of the two cases. 
B. Principled Decisionmaking 
1. The Intuition 
Intuitively, agreement at the level of principles or standards seems 
to be deeper, more important, and more deserving of respect than 
 
 175.  I am not convinced that it really is unfair that the plaintiff in Case B lost his case 
whereas his counterpart in Case A won, since the court as a whole treated the plaintiffs 
according to the same principles. Perhaps fairness tolerates unequal outcomes so long as 
adjudicators make a genuine and competent effort to apply the same principles across similar 
cases (whereas unequal outcomes would be unfair if they were the result of negligence or 
intentional discrimination). However, it is beyond the scope of my efforts here to develop a 
theory of fair legal treatment and I recognize that for some the incongruity might seem 
problematic for reasons of fairness. 
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agreement at the level of results.176 Let’s return to the hypothetical 
case of the mother faced with the question of whether to let her 
daughter participate in competitive gymnastics. The mother decides in 
favor of granting permission to her daughter based on the principle 
that she should promote her daughter’s physical well-being. The 
mother seems to be aligned in a deeper and more important way with 
the sister who also bases her decision on the physical well-being 
principle, but comes out against allowing the child to take up 
gymnastics, than she does with the other sister, who comes out in 
favor of granting permission based on the principle that parents 
should act to promote their daughters’ popularity. 
Consider again Will v. Calvert: the concurrence and dissent agreed 
on the test or set of principles that should be taken into account in 
determining whether a federal court judge has an obligation to 
adjudicate a particular dispute. The principles that both opinions 
endorsed were articulated in a previous case, Colorado River, and had 
to do with “[w]ise judicial administration,” in particular the 
“conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of 
litigation.”177 Nevertheless, the concurrence and dissent disagreed on 
outcome: the concurrence voted to reverse the decision of the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals (against the district judge’s stay) 
and remand the case, whereas the dissent voted to affirm the decision 
of the court below.178 This disagreement was a product of a particular 
 
 176.  For more on the importance of principles or higher-level rationales in adjudication, see 
Neil MacCormick, Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 155, 
157 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1987) (arguing that “it is as justificatory reasoning that judicial 
opinions are normative, and it is only as being normative that they can go toward the 
construction of normative law”); see also Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, 
Unpacking the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 115 (1986) (discussing the value of conceptual unity in 
adjudication); Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social 
Choice, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1343 n.113 (1995). For historical discussions of the point, see 
Lord Mansfield, Fisher v. Prince. 3 Burr. 1363, 1364 (“The reason and spirit of cases make law; 
not the letter of particular precedents.”); Lord Holt, Cage v. Acton, 12 Mod. 288, 294 (stating 
that the reason for a resolution should be given more consideration than the resolution itself) 
(both quoted in Beck, J., in Dubuque v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 39 Iowa 56, 79–80 (1874)); 
EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES, Sec. 16 (1884) (“[W]e have always considered it 
a most undignified piece of perverseness to affect to ascribe a sort of infallibility to a judge’s 
decision at the same time that discredit is thrown upon his powers of reasoning.”); see also 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 261 n.4, (1986) (denouncing the notion that “a statement of 
legal opinion joined by five Justices [where some are in dissent] does not carry the force of 
law”). 
 177.  Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
 178.  Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 668, 677 (1978). 
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procedural detail—that Colorado River had been decided after the 
district court issued its stay.179 
The plurality and concurring factions in Will, on the other hand, 
evidenced no agreement at the level of principle, but happened to 
agree on the decision to reverse the court below.180 Whereas the 
plurality reached its conclusion based on factors that led it to judge 
the district court’s stay as acceptable, the concurrence reached its 
conclusion based on a completely different, procedural rather than 
substantive, consideration.181 The agreement between the plurality and 
concurrence was a coincidence, a product of the procedural 
peculiarities of the case.182 The agreement between the concurrence 
and dissent, on the other hand, ran deeper: their agreement was a 
matter of principle, and therefore warrants greater consideration and 
respect than the concurrence-plurality agreement, which concerned 
only the outcome. 
In plurality cases, judges often make a special point of noting in 
their opinions that, although they agree with other factions on result, 
they disagree with those same factions on fundamental points of 
rationale or principle. For example, consider the case of National 
Mutual Insurance Company v. Tidewater Transfer Company, where the 
Supreme Court determined that a statute permitting District of 
Columbia citizens to sue citizens of the states in federal district courts 
was constitutional, reversing the Fourth Circuit’s judgment to the 
contrary.183 The plurality reached this decision based on its conviction 
that Congress is permitted, under its Article I powers, to expand as it 
sees fit the jurisdiction accorded federal courts under Article III.184 
 
 179.  See id. at 668 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that, “[b]ecause Judge Will’s stay 
order was issued prior to this Court’s decision in Colorado River, and he therefore did not have 
such guidance as that case affords in this area, I join in the Court’s reversal of the Court of 
Appeals’ issuance of a writ of mandamus,” and asserting that, “[t]he Court of Appeals should 
have done no more than require reconsideration of the case by Judge Will in light of Colorado 
River”). 
 180.  See id. at 667–68. 
 181.  See id. at 661–667, 668. 
 182.  As Judge Thompson writing for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals put it, “Justice 
Blackmun, who provided the deciding vote in Calvert, concurred in the judgment solely to allow 
the district court to reconsider its stay in light of the Colorado River case. Calvert, 437 U.S. at 
668 . . . (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). Both Justice Blackmun and the four 
dissenters agreed that Colorado River controlled the outcome in Calvert. See Moses H. Cone, 
460 U.S. at 17 . . . . Thus, the Calvert plurality opinion . . . is actually the minority opinion in the 
case.” Minucci v. Agrama, 868 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 183.  Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. of Dist. of Col. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 604 (1949). 
 184.  Id. at 600. 
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Even though the concurring justices (Rutledge and Murphy) also 
deemed the Act in question to be constitutional, the concurring 
opinion emphasizes their deep disagreement with the plurality view.185 
The concurring justices based their decision on principles of “justice, 
convenience, and practicality,” which “point to the conclusion that 
[District citizens] should [have access to federal courts] as other 
citizens and even aliens do”—rather than on the broad principle of 
Congressional discretion over the jurisdiction of federal courts on 
which the plurality relied.186 Highlighting the significance of the 
disagreement between the concurrence and plurality, Rutledge 
proclaimed (in the concurring opinion) that he would sooner accept 
the opposite result than accept the reasons endorsed by the 
plurality.187 
The majoritarian principle provides that we should accord 
precedential authority to a point that receives majority support. On 
the refined majoritarian principle that I endorse, if one majority 
agrees as to point A and another majority agrees as to point B, and we 
can give full authority to only one of points A and B, then we should 
give authority to the deeper or more important point. In my view, 
points of principle are generally deeper and more important than 
points of result, at least in the context of adjudication. Even if we set 
 
 185.  Judge Bea of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that, “Justice Rutledge, 
joined by Justice Murphy, strenuously disagreed that Congress had the power to expand Article 
III jurisdiction beyond the bases enumerated in the Constitution. . . . The four remaining 
Justices [making up the dissent] would have declined to overrule Hepburn; but they—like Justice 
Rutledge—also vehemently rejected Justice Jackson’s suggestion that Congress had the power to 
create subject-matter jurisdiction not conferred by Article III.” United States v. Davis, 825 F.3d 
1014, 1040 n.9 (9th Cir. 2016) (Bea, J., dissenting). For an example of a case where factions 
disagreed on outcome but nevertheless evidenced strong agreement with respect to principle or 
standard to be applied, see Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980) (where, as Justice 
Stevens observed in the majority opinion of a subsequent case, “the disagreement between the 
majority and the dissenters . . . with respect to the [application of law to fact] is less significant 
than the agreement on the standard to be applied”). United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 
117 n.12, (1984). Indeed, Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent in Walter, began by 
recognizing the agreement between the plurality and dissent on the standard that should govern 
the case. Blackmun went on to explain that his disagreement with the plurality opinion involved 
the plurality’s “parsing of the case’s ‘bizarre facts’”; it was this difference that led the factions to 
reach different conclusions despite their higher-level agreement. Walter, 447 U.S. at 662–63 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 186.  Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 617 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
 187.  See id. at 626 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (“I am not in accord with the proposed 
extension of ‘legislative’ jurisdiction under Article I for the first time to the federal district 
courts outside the District of Columbia organized pursuant to Article III, and the consequent 
impairment of the latter Article’s limitations upon judicial power; and I would dissent from such 
a holding even more strongly than I would from a decision today reaffirming [Chief Justice 
Marshall’s] Hepburn ruling [under which the Act in question would be unconstitutional].”). 
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aside the practical difficulties of a result-centered approach, then, we 
have good reason to prioritize principles. 
2. The Particularist Caveat 
I do not mean to suggest that decisionmakers necessarily feel 
more strongly about the principles they endorse than the results they 
favor, nor do I want to suggest that principles are necessary for 
effective decisionmaking. In some cases, judges might have firmer 
convictions about outcomes than they do about the principles that 
best justify those outcomes.188 This phenomenon is not uncommon in 
the context of moral decisionmaking: sometimes an action seems 
definitively wrong, even if we do not know exactly why. And 
sometimes we might set aside a moral principle that we otherwise 
accept if, as applied to a particular case, it prescribes a course of 
action that seems morally unacceptable. 
Indeed, some philosophers argue that, in the moral domain, 
principles are dispensable; they defend this view (known as 
“particularism”) over the more conventional and common notion of 
moral decisionmaking as necessarily grounded in principles.189 
Whatever we might think of moral particularism, however, a 
particularist view of adjudication is highly problematic. Even if we do 
not have a general moral duty to consider or act on principles, judges 
have special responsibilities that can only be fulfilled through the 
provision of principled justifications for their decisions. The following 
subsection addresses these responsibilities. 
3. Legitimacy, Authority, and the Rule of Law 
If plurality decisions were binding as to their facts and results only, 
then even if those facts and results could constitute rules with some 
degree of generalizability, the body of case law that plurality decisions 
represent would be unprincipled. This is troubling if, as many scholars 
have argued, case law derives its legitimacy and authority, at least in 
part, from the legal rationales or principles that justify judicial 
 
 188.  As Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 90, at 56, observe, “In some hard cases . . . a 
judge’s view about the outcome of the case may be considerably more clear and more deeply 
held than her understanding of how an evolving doctrine should be shaped to support not just 
that outcome, but the correct outcome in future cases as well.” 
 189.  See generally Jonathan Dancy, Moral Particularism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PHILOSOPHY (Winter 2017 Edition) (ed. Edward N. Zalta) https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/win2017/entries/moral-particularism/; JONATHAN DANCY, ETHICS WITHOUT 
PRINCIPLES (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2004). 
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decisions.190 As Dorf writes, “judicial accountability and legitimacy 
derive from judicial rationality, which in turn will be found in the 
rationales offered by courts to justify their decisions.”191 
Many commentators, both scholars and judges, have suggested 
that the rule of law requires judges to base their decisions on 
transparent and principled reasons. For example, Herbert Wechsler 
famously argued that, “the main constituent of the judicial process is 
precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to 
every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and 
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”192 
Judges have an obligation, as part of their judicial role, to apply 
general principles in the process of adjudication and to articulate 
these principles publicly.193 My favored model of precedent enables 
precedent-setting courts to fulfill this obligation even when they issue 
plurality decisions. On other models, a plurality decision does not 
stand for general principles that were endorsed by a court—
accordingly, on these models, this type of decision represents an 
abdication of the judicial role. 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
Justice Scalia’s partial dissent criticized the O’Connor, Kennedy, and 
Souter plurality for failing to articulate underlying principles that 
would justify their conclusion and enable future decisionmakers to 
 
 190.  See Judge Easterbrook in Matter of Krynicki, 983 F.2d 74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Judges 
deliberate in private but issue public decisions after public arguments based on public records. 
The political branches of government claim legitimacy by election, judges by reason.”); Dorf, 
supra note 78, at 2059 (“[T]he precedential force of an earlier case ultimately rests upon the 
reasons underlying the court’s decision. This is true both because absent a consideration of 
reasons, namely, abstract principles, there is no such thing as precedent, and because precedents 
derive their legitimacy from their reasoning.”); Novak, supra note 70, at 757 (“A coherent 
majority rationale is particularly important in the American legal system, which has traditionally 
placed special emphasis on the reasoning underlying a particular decision to determine its 
precedential value.”); G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration 59 VA. L. 
REV. 279 (1973). Whether on pragmatic or normative grounds, some courts have explicitly 
rejected the idea that results in themselves could be binding. See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 205 
N.W.2d 461, 467 (1973) (“The clear rule in Michigan is that a majority of the Court must agree 
on a ground for decision in order to make that binding precedent for future cases. If there is 
merely a majority for a particular result, then the parties to the case are bound by the judgment 
but the case is not authority beyond the immediate parties.”) (emphasis added). 
 191.  Dorf, supra note 78, at 2040. 
 192.  Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 15 (1959). 
 193.  For an argument to this effect, see Leslie Green, Law and the Role of a Judge, 17–18, 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 47/2014 (September 13, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2495953. 
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extend their reasoning to other cases.194 Scalia explained, as follows, 
that he does not 
have any objection to the notion that, in applying legal principles, 
one should rely only upon the facts that are contained in the 
record . . . . But what is remarkable about the joint opinion’s fact-
intensive analysis is that it does not result in any measurable 
clarification of the “undue burden” standard. . . . We do not 
know . . . in what respects the record would have had to differ 
before an opposite conclusion would have been appropriate. The 
inherently standardless nature of this inquiry invites the district 
judge to give effect to his personal preferences about abortion.195 
Scalia’s purported concern (whether or not he was correct in his 
analysis) is that the three justices in the plurality listed some facts and 
reached the conclusion that on those facts the provision at issue 
imposed a substantial obstacle to abortion. However, in the absence 
of an explanation for why given those facts the provision imposed 
such an obstacle, future courts would lack guidance as to how to apply 
the decision—effectively, they would be unconstrained by it. Or at the 
least, future courts would not be bound by the decision in a principled 
way because (according to Scalia) there were no principles, or at least 
no readily discernible ones, behind the rule. 
Unsurprisingly, the justices who signed onto the lead opinion did 
not understand themselves to be reaching an unprincipled decision; 
those justices too espoused the virtues and necessity of principled 
decisionmaking in adjudication, acknowledging that “our 
contemporary understanding is such that a decision without 
principled justification would be no judicial act at all.”196 Similar 
pronouncements can be found in many other cases. In Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, for example, Scalia wrote that “[l]aws promulgated by the 
Legislative Branch can be inconsistent, illogical, and ad hoc; law 
pronounced by the courts must be principled, rational, and based 
upon reasoned distinctions.”197 He traced that obligation to the 
meaning of “‘[t]he judicial Power’ created by Article III, § 1[] of the 
Constitution.”198 Alternatives to the principle-centric, dissent-
 
 194.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979–1002 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 195.  Id. at 991–92. For a related discussion of Scalia’s point here, see Dorf, supra note 78, at 
2032 n.131. 
 196.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 865. 
 197.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 278 (2004). 
 198.  Id. 
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inclusive approach to plurality decisions are in tension with the 
judiciary’s explicit commitment to decisionmaking consistency at the 
level of principle. 
In the context of a plurality decision, when some members of the 
court (those signing onto the lead opinion) come to the same 
conclusion as other members (those signing onto a concurring 
opinion), the agreement is the result of coincidence rather than 
principle. This poses a legitimacy and authority problem. The court 
(unless possibly if we look to dissenting opinions) did not agree on 
rationale, so the result was not generated by some rationale that the 
court has endorsed (given the majoritarian premise that no less than a 
majority of judges on a court can speak for the court as a whole). 
Judicial decisions are authoritative over subsequent cases not because 
a majority of judges voted in favor of some party, but rather because 
and to the extent that they reflect the principled reasoning of a court. 
In a plurality decision, then, the only authoritative portion of the case 
comprises the rationales and principles, if any, that a majority of 
judges endorsed. 
Some courts have discussed the problem of accepting as binding a 
rule where no majority of the precedent-setting court agreed on a 
rationale that would support the rule. For example, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals had an opportunity to comment on the issue in U.S. 
v. Donovan, where Rapanos v. United States, a Supreme Court dual-
majority decision, served as a central precedent.199 The court 
acknowledged the difficulty of following a decision where no majority 
agreed at the level of rationale or principle, while observing that such 
majority agreement is, fortunately, present in Rapanos. As the Third 
Circuit Court explained, “[b]ecause the four Rapanos dissenters 
explicitly endorsed both the plurality’s and Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisdictional tests, we are not faced with a concern . . . that combining 
the votes of Justices who joined in different opinions would lead to 
unprincipled outcomes.”200 The Third Circuit explained further that, 
[w]e need not “combine” the votes of Justices relying on different 
rationales to find that a majority of the Rapanos Justices would 
come out a particular way in a given case. Two separate rationales 
each independently enjoy the support of five or more Rapanos 
 
 199.  United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2011); Rapanos v. United States, 547 
U.S. 715 (2006). 
 200.  Donovan, 661 F.3d at 184 n.8. 
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Justices, without any need to “count[ ] the votes” of Justices 
relying on different rationales.201 
In Donovan, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recalled its 
decision in Rappa v. New Castle County: the Rappa court criticized the 
predictive approach to following plurality decisions, where a court 
tries to determine how the past court would have ruled given the 
present facts and decides the present case accordingly.202 Writing for 
the majority in Rappa, Judge Becker observed that “count[ing] votes 
in this manner and giv[ing] them precedential value . . . would be 
unprincipled.”203 This is because the result generated by the vote 
counting method is not necessarily supported by any rationale that 
did or would receive the minimum necessary (i.e., majority) support: 
“[t]hus, giving precedential value to a matrix predicting results would 
produce a system of low level . . . formal rules but a system not rooted 
in any consistent constitutional values.”204 
With dual-majority cases, however, courts can find majority 
endorsement of a single rationale (or set of principles) if they are 
willing to consider the reasoning of dissenting opinions—as we saw, 
for example, in Moses Cone and Donovan. Accordingly, dual 
majorities possess the features necessary for legitimate, authoritative, 
and accountable adjudicative products: we have majority agreement 
on rationale, where the rationale is integrally connected to the 
decision or case outcome, and we have public expression of that 
rationale. 
If the authority possessed by a dual-majority case is a matter of 
the principled agreement between the plurality or concurrence and 
the dissent, then subsequent, precedent-constrained courts should 
treat that principled agreement as the binding portion of the case. The 
other parts of the decision have no legitimate grounds for authority 
and accordingly should not be taken to exert binding force over 
subsequent disputes. 
 
 201.  Id. (quoting Rappa v. New Castle Cty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1060 n.24 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 202.  Rappa v. New Castle Cty., 18 F.3d 1043, 1060 n.24 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. The Rappa opinion cites for support Rehnquist’s dissent in Metromedia, Inc. v. 
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981), where the justice “lamented that it was ‘a genuine 
misfortune to have the Court’s treatment of the subject [the constitutionality of billboard 
regulations] be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definitive principles can be clearly 
drawn.” Id. at 1057. 
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CONCLUSION 
The recent case of Hughes v. United States raised awareness about 
the problem that plurality decisions pose for the purposes of a 
precedent analysis, and the case generated vigorous debate about the 
issue. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ultimately declined to address 
the question, leaving it to other courts to figure out how best to 
ascertain the precedential effect of plurality decisions.205 Many courts, 
including the U.S. Supreme Court on multiple occasions, have taken 
the dissent-inclusive approach to following dual-majority decisions. 
These courts, however, have not adequately explained why they chose 
to count dissents in the precedent calculus. Courts that take the 
dissent-inclusive view seem to find it self-evident that if a majority 
agreed on a set of governing principles in the precedent case, then 
future courts are obligated to apply that set of principles. Other courts 
though, and the majority of extra-judicial commentators, instead take 
it as self-evident that dissenting opinions cannot establish binding law. 
So not only are opinions divided on the matter, but productive 
dialogue between the sides has been limited. 
I began this paper by defining plurality and dual-majority 
decisions, and explaining why and when we might expect a dual-
majority case to arise. I then defended the dissent-inclusive method 
for following dual-majority decisions and evaluated that method 
against alternatives. I argued that the very reasons commentators 
have offered for excluding dissents actually push in the opposite 
direction. I argued further that the principles underlying stare decisis 
itself would seem to favor, on balance, the dissent-inclusive view, as 
would the virtues of principled decisionmaking and considerations 
concerning the source of precedential authority and legitimacy. 
The confusion surrounding plurality decisions and their 
precedential value has driven many commentators to disparage 
plurality decisions altogether, claiming that these decisions represent 
an abdication of judicial responsibility and guarantee precedential 
chaos. In my view, this attack on plurality decisions is unwarranted. 
Plurality decisions offer unusually rich and revealing collections of 
judicial reasoning and theorizing. From dual-majority decisions in 
particular, one can see how the very same theory can generate 
completely different results depending on, for example, how a given 
fact is interpreted. By studying dual majorities, one can see how a 
 
 205.  See Hughes v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1772 (2018). 
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concurrence is sometimes more deeply aligned with the dissent than it 
is with the plurality with which it “concurs.” The dissent-inclusive 
view of precedent accords this kind of alignment the respect that it 
deserves. 
Although many commentators have suggested that affording 
precedential status to dissenting opinions is contrary to basic common 
law intuitions, the dissent-inclusive view is heretical only on its face. In 
practice, judges typically do not formally concur in an opinion or even 
part of an opinion in the event that they disagree in full with the 
judgment.206 The designation “concurring in part and dissenting in 
part” has generally been reserved for disputes with multiple 
judgments.207 A judge who “concurs in part” agrees with some of the 
judgments and disagrees with others. Formally, the mark of “dissent” 
is given to an opinion that disagrees in full with the judgment(s) of the 
court, even if that opinion agrees with principles or theories espoused 
in opinions that come out the other way on judgment. Perhaps courts 
should reform their practices so that judges who disagree with the 
court’s judgment but agree with some of the reasoning from opinions 
concurring in the judgment would formally concur in that reasoning. I 
imagine that such a reform would make scholars and judges alike 
more amenable to the idea of affording precedential status to 
majority agreement on principle even if that means including the 
 
 206.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 332 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(where, in an opinion labelled a “dissent,” Justice Powell expresses considerable agreement with 
the lead opinion on principle, but disagrees on the outcome); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 
U.S. 655 (1978) (where the concurrence and dissents largely agree except on result, but there is 
no formal or meta-textual recognition of this agreement); Kulko v. Superior Ct. of Cal. In and 
For City and Cty. of San Francisco, 436 U.S. 84, 101–02 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (where 
the justices in the dissent expressed agreement with standards that the majority applied, but 
those justices reached a different result from the majority, based on their “independent 
weighing of the facts”); United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 420–21 (3d Cir. 1982) 
(Aldisert, J., dissenting) (where the opinion marked as a “dissent” agrees with the majority 
opinion on everything except “the bottom line”). Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979), is a rare 
example of a case where the dissent disagreed in full with the judgment but formally signed onto 
a portion of the lead opinion. See supra note 117. 
 207.  See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING, 155 (2d ed., AuthorHouse 
2009) (“A dissent in part is a dissenting opinion which disagrees only with some specific part of 
the majority decision. In decisions that require multi-part holdings because they involve 
multiple legal claims or consolidated cases, judges may write an opinion ‘concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.’”); Dissent in Part Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL (accessed June 30, 
2018), https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/dissent-in-part/ (emphasis added) (“The term ‘dissent in 
part’ is an opinion by one or more judges who disagree in part with the decision reached by the 
majority of judges. . . . In decisions that need multi-part holdings because they involve multiple 
legal claims or consolidated cases, judges may write an opinion ‘concurring in part and 
dissenting in part.’”). 
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views of judges who rejected the majority conclusion. 
But the doctrine of precedent represents a collaborative 
enterprise between precedent-setting and precedent-bound courts, 
and the latter courts ought to do their best with the material that they 
are given. Even in unanimous decisions, precedent-setting courts 
typically do not explicitly specify which portions of the opinion 
represent binding precedent and which are dicta. That kind of parsing 
is largely left to subsequent courts attempting to interpret the 
precedent and apply it to new disputes. 
I believe that it is likewise up to precedent-bound courts, when 
interpreting a fractured decision, to determine whether the decision 
contains a majority position on principle and to give any such position 
precedential effect. 
 
